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ABSTRACT  
Social accountability has, throughout the past few decades, emerged as an essential means 
through which residents within Council jurisdictions participate in local governance. This paper 
explores the conceptual and contextual issues to the notion of social accountability within the 
context of the city of Harare. Has the local authority institutionalized social accountability 
adequately to promote effective municipal governance? What have been the key challenges 
affecting realization of optimal social accountability outcomes? A comprehensive review of 
relevant sector literature shows that participatory governance has not been attained in Harare. A 
purely qualitative methodology was used as part of generating relevant data. Through an analysis 
of primary data generated during fieldwork, this researcher concludes that citizen participation in 
urban governance in Harare is tokenistic.  Residents are only engaged to rubberstamp decisions 
exclusively made by Council technocrats. This researcher recommends that there be a 
paradigmatic shift to ensure that local governance is participatory, egalitarian and responsive. 
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                                          CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTORY  
“Social accountability is the obligation of power-holders to take responsibility for their actions, the dynamics of 
rights and responsibilities that exist between people and the institutions that have an impact on their lives, in 
particular the relationship between the duties of the state and the entitlements of citizens” (UNDP, 2013). 
1.0 Chapter Introduction 
 This chapter introduces the nexus between social accountability and municipal governance 
within the context of the Harare City Council. It provides a brief background to the historical 
evolution of Harare and its transition into a self-governing local authority. The paper then discusses 
the fundamental rationale for undertaking the research. More importantly, the problem statement 
section identifies the gaps in the body of knowledge relating to the institutionalization of social 
accountability issues in urban governance in Zimbabwe. Consequently, this researcher deliberately 
generated data to add new knowledge on the social accountability discourse within the city of 
Harare. A threefold spectrum of research questions was adopted to guide the data generation 
process. The questions mainly focused on whether or not the local authority under review has 
adequately institutionalized social accountability as a governance tool and, if so, the mechanisms 
it uses. Emphasis was given to explore the alternative courses of action that can be adopted by the 
Council to enhance participatory governance in the city. A brief discussion of the research 
methodology employed is provided as is the overall structural organization of the paper. 
1.1 Harare: Historical evolution and present governance regime 
 The city of Harare lies on the north-eastern part of Zimbabwe south of the Sahara. With an 
estimated population of 1 568 663 people (Government of Zimbabwe, 2015), Harare has a 
generally hilly topography characterized by rocky areas in the south and a generally flatter northern 
part. The city is sandwiched at the watershed plateau of two major rivers namely Limpopo and 
Zambezi (Rakodi, 1995). In social terms, the level of extreme poverty prevalent in the city is of 
unimaginable proportions. The majority of the residents rely on informal sector activities such as 
vegetable vending, carpentry, car washing and other blue-collar jobs. This is partly a consequence 
of the successive economic crises that the country has, since the turn of the new millennium in 
2000, been grappling with. The World Bank, in 2015, estimated that approximately 85% of the 
Zimbabwean citizenry is involved in informal sector activities in order to eke a living. 
Consequently, it (the World Bank) ranks Zimbabwe as a ‘fragile state’. 
Furthermore, the governance architecture within the Harare City Council has undergone a 
series of dynamic transformations since the city was founded in 1890. The British South Africa 
Company’s Pioneer Column was the first administrative regime that governed Harare. It was a 
mercenary colonial extension of British hegemonic rule. According to Rakodi and Mutizwa-
Mangiza (1990), the colonial settler regime governed the city through a racially-charged system 
that segregated access to the urban area to black Africans. Originally named Fort Salisbury (latter 
Salisbury), Harare was declared a fully-fledged municipality in 1897. It was bestowed with the 
powers to determine its own spatial and socio-politico-economic dispensation by the central 
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regime. In 1935 Harare became a formally recognised city (Rakodi, 1995). It became the colonial 
administrative capital of the Federation of Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia), Southern Rhodesia 
(present day Zimbabwe) and Malawi (then known as Nyasaland). After the attainment of political 
independence in 1980, the city became increasingly governed by an emerging black elite. It has 
traditionally comprised elective (Councillors) and appointive (or management) staff members as 
part of its administrative structure. The Mayor is the overall political patron while the Town Clerk 
heads the management. The Mayors have usually been ceremonial except between 2005 and 2008 
when the office assumed executive authority.  
1.2 Problem statement and justification of the study 
Although social accountability has widely been regarded as an effective approach for 
promoting citizen-based and participatory service delivery, it has often received scanty attention 
as a subject of scholarly inquiry in Zimbabwe. Urban citizens have frequently been involved in 
local governance by Councils merely to rubberstamp annual budgets that are forecasted 
exclusively by technocrats (De Visser, Machingauta and Steytler, 2010; Masvau, 2007). The UN-
Habitat (2005) concurs with this view, stating that limited empirical research substantiates the 
claim often made by urban Councils in Zimbabwe that local governance in general, and service 
delivery in particular, is done in an accountable and transparent manner. In its argument, the 
incessant service riots that characterize citizen-local government relations lend credence to the 
assertion that Councils do not effectively harness the participation of communities in the 
administration of local issues. This paper explores the extent to which the Harare City Council has 
institutionalized social accountability as a means of fostering participatory governance. The need 
to identify an array of factors, inhibitive or promotional, that affect institutionalization of social 
accountability within the city of Harare from achieving participatory service delivery justifies this 
study. The outcome of this in-depth inquiry will be used to fill the gaps that exist in the present 
body of knowledge insofar as institutionalization of social accountability in governance in 
Zimbabwe is concerned. More importantly, the research outcomes are useful for civil society and 
citizens to lobby the Council to promote social accountability through evidence-based strategies.  
1.3 Research rationale  
1.3.1 Aim  
The essence of this research was to examine whether institutionalizing social accountability 
within the Harare City Council can enhance municipal governance.  
1.3.1 Objectives 
The overall purposes of this study were to: 
 Explore whether the Harare City Council has fully institutionalized social accountability within 
its governance structure for managing residents’ issues effectively; 
 Find out the social accountability tools that the Council uses and their effectiveness; and 
 Recommend, on the basis of generated findings and conclusions, some alternative ways that 
the local authority can use to improve residents’ participation in public administration. 
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1.3.2 Research hypothesis 
This research is founded on the following hypothesis: 
 There is a positive correlation between institutionalizing social accountability in municipal 
governance and achieving optimal service delivery outcomes. 
1.3.3 Research questions 
Among the most fundamental questions that this research sought to explore are: 
 To what extent has the Harare City Council institutionalized social accountability in its 
administration of local affairs? 
 Which mechanisms does the Council use to promote citizens’ participation in local 
governance and to what extent have these been effective? 
 What can be done to enhance participatory local governance within the City of Harare? 
These questions are critical for conceptualizing the nature and extent of the challenges 
that urban Councils in general, and specifically the Harare City Council, face in institutionalizing 
social accountability. The questions help to locate the key limiting factors that hinder urbanites 
from participating actively in the management of their affairs by the Council.  
1.4 Methodology  
The research largely employed qualitative methods in generating relevant data to diagnose 
the factors inhibiting institutionalization of social accountability in the city of Harare. 
Questionnaires were administered, interviews conducted, focus group discussions held and 
strategic documents reviewed as part of the data generation process. More so, since the research 
entailed considerable expenses, sampling was purposively done in the targeted area to ensure that 
study outcomes were produced timeously. As a fully-fledged urban province, Harare Metropolitan 
Province also incorporates a small city (Chitungwiza) to the south-west of the central business 
district and a slum area, Epworth, located south-east. These are managed under separate semi-
autonomous local authorities. The city of Harare, where this study was carried out, comprises five 
(5) districts/regions and 144 formally planned residential suburbs. In addition, there are 
approximately sixty-three (63) slum areas in and around the city’s greenbelt (Dialogue on Shelter, 
2014). One-fifth (or 20%) of suburbs in each of the districts was sampled. In addition, twelve (12) 
informal settlements also constituted a significant part of the sample population in this study. 
Harare presents a strategic case from where general conclusions on the need to institutionalize 
social accountability in urban areas in Zimbabwe can be drawn. 
1.5 Organization of this paper 
 This paper is organized into five key chapters. Chapter 1 gives an introductory overview 
of the status of social accountability and provides contextual and conceptual clarity to the notion. 
Chapter 2 essentially focuses on the review of literature on the social accountability discourse in 
municipal governance through both global and local (Zimbabwe) perspectives. Chapter 3 discusses 
in detail the methodological design that was used in generating data. Chapter 4 presents and 
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analyzes the data that were generated during the fieldwork phase of the research. A combination 
of data presentation methods and analytical frames is used for the purposes of analysis. Summary 
conclusions and possible alternative courses of action to enhance social accountability in local 
governance are given in Chapter 5. 
1.6 Chapter conclusion 
This chapter gave a brief overview of what the research sought to explore. This researcher 
focussed, in this section, on introducing the subject matter that prompted the research. As a result, 
there is neither an in-depth analysis of notion of social accountability nor presentation of study 
findings. The chapter is intended to provide guidance on the rationale of the study and why the 
research, this researcher contended, required an empirical study.  In the following chapter (Chapter 
2) this researcher turns focus on analyzing the current body of knowledge insofar as the social 
accountability discourse is concerned. The conceptual and contextual underpinnings of social 
accountability as an overarching urban governance approach are provided in this particular section 
of the report. In addition, social accountability systems and paradigms are analyzed within the 
context of geospatial regions of the world. 
 
  
                           CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
“The SAcc [social accountability] field has outgrown conventional conceptual frameworks, and lessons learned 
from practice should inform new approaches” World Bank, 2015 
2.1 Chapter Introduction 
 The first chapter of this report introduced the notion of social accountability. The rationale 
behind carrying out the study as well as its overall aim and objectives were provided in the 
preceding section. The problem that prompted the study was identified, filtered and defined. A 
brief methodological approach used in generating the relevant data during the fieldwork phase of 
this research was provided. In this section the focus turns to the conceptual and contextual issues 
on the social accountability discourse. It begins by clarifying the concept of social accountability 
as well as analyzing its constituent parts. The chapter goes further to explore the various 
operational approaches under which social accountability is exercised. A global synopsis draws 
cases studies from both the global North and South. The analysis then zooms in to the local context 
(that is, Zimbabwe’s social accountability experiences). Whilst social accountability is driven by 
different development agencies within the nation-state, this researcher deliberately focuses on civil 
society based initiatives. This is done not least because civil society organizations interact closely 
with recipient communities of public services but also constitute an essential development actor.  
2.2 Defining social accountability  
A cursory review of development literature will show that the concept of social 
accountability has been defined variously by different theorists and relevant sector agencies. 
According to the United Nations Development Programme (2010) ‘social accountability refers to 
a form of accountability that emerges through actions by citizens and civil society organizations 
[CSOs] aimed at holding the state to account, as well as efforts by government and other actors 
[media, private sector, donors] to support these actions.’ In essence, social accountability enhances 
participatory governance in municipal affairs ensuring robust engagement between the citizenry 
and the government (at both central and local tiers).  Malena & Tamang (2011) define social 
accountability as the broad range of actions and mechanisms (beyond voting) that citizens can use 
to hold the state to account. In addition, it (social accountability) comprises the actions on the part 
of government, civil society, media and other societal actors that promote or facilitate these efforts. 
Social accountability must initiate demand-driven and bottom-up citizen voice and oversight in 
the delivery of public services (Malena, Forster & Singh, 2004). Thus, consultation, networking 
and dialogue amongst sectors actors are essential for effective social accountability processes.  
2.3 Conceptual clarity and framework 
Various development theorists and agencies have offered alternative conceptual 
frameworks for analyzing the concept of social accountability. Perhaps the most plausible 
explanatory view is the one offered by the World Bank in 2003. The institution conceptualizes 
social accountability as a multi-actor interactive process amongst citizens (clients, 
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politicians/policymakers and organizational providers). Apart from these, but equally essential, are 
the frontline professionals. Figure 1 below depicts this multi-dimensional nexus. 
Figure 1: Conceptual framework for social accountability  
 
  Source: World Bank, 2003: 49; UNDP, 2013: 37 
The World Bank advances an argument whose anchors are fourfold. First, service delivery 
programmes can be enhanced ‘by putting poor people at the centre of service provision: by 
enabling them to monitor and discipline service providers, by amplifying their voice in 
policymaking and by strengthening the incentives for providers to serve the poor’ (ibid). Second, 
citizens must not only be perceived as constituted only by individuals but also as households and 
corporates. Third, politicians and policymakers are, at law, and consequently as duty-bearers, 
mandated to provide the services that the citizenry demands (cf Nofianti & Suseno, 2014; Filios, 
1985). Fourth and finally, the operationalization of the synergies amongst the three stakeholders 
is the responsibility of the frontline professionals. Thus, the significance of role clarity amongst 
these sector actors for realizing optimal social accountability outcomes cannot be overemphasized. 
More so, the conceptual framework proposed by the World Bank illustrates the synergies 
among the actors within the social accountability chain. These linkages, constituting the ‘long and 
short routes’ of accountability, are analyzed within the context of: 
 Voice and politics: bonding citizens and politicians; 
  Compacts: connecting politicians (policymakers) and providers; 
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 Management: attaching provider organizations with frontline professionals; and 
 Client power: linking clients with providers. 
The short route of accountability directly connects service providers and citizens. On the one hand, 
the citizens, as rights-holders, focus the quality, affordability and reliability of the services offered 
whilst the providers are preoccupied with economic returns on the other. The long route of 
accountability, as the World Bank conceptualization suggests, explains that the state acts as a 
strategic interaction conduit between citizens and service providers. Hence, at the practical level 
the relationships amongst these sector agencies are often both mutually reinforcing and debilitating. 
Evidence abounds in development literature (Flores, 2011; Kluvers, 2011; Pasteur, 1999), 
in addition, suggests that there are three basic building blocks that characterize social 
accountability processes. These are enhancing access to information, amplifying citizen voice and 
realizing negotiated change. In relation to municipal governance access to information enables 
citizens to engage effectively and robustly with public service providers (Gaventa & Barrett, 2010). 
Deliberate withholding of information from citizens, through, for instance, repressive legislative 
instruments, is an antithesis towards promoting democratic and participatory urban governance 
(Chakaipa, 2010; Green 2013). There is, therefore, need to broaden interactive spaces that promote 
effective engagement between citizens and the state. Khus (2010) concurs with this view asserting 
that public institutions ought to be responsive to the aspirations of the recipient communities upon 
whose ‘benevolence’ they survive. Similarly, in his analysis of the concept of social accountability, 
Sharma (2011) concludes that the ultimate goal of social accountability is to achieve inclusive 
local governance.  
2.4 Contextual social accountability perspectives 
A vast body of literature exists on the social accountability discourse. Much of the focus 
has been on documenting community experiences in their pursuit of making local authorities 
responsive to their rights. However, as noted by O’Meally (2013), few scholars have preoccupied 
themselves with analyzing the gamut of social accountability tools and their applicability on 
leveraging governance processes in different contexts. An analysis of how social accountability 
systems have been operationalized globally should begin by mapping the basic tenets of the 
process itself. 
2.4.1 Basic elements of social accountability 
Table 2 below illustrates some common elements of social accountability. It is instructive 
to point out here that the choice of which particular approach to use depends, in part, on the local 
context[s]. In addition, the selection is also a function of the specific issues under review at a 
particular point in time. 
Table 1: Basic elements of social accountability 
Element                  Description 
Social Accountability and Municipal 
Governance   
 
 
 
Preparing community and civil 
society groups to engage 
 Raising the awareness of citizens;  
 Building confidence and capacity for engagement; and 
 Fostering networks and coalitions. 
Collecting, analysing and using 
information 
 Finding, securing and analysing information on government activities; 
 Translating information into different formats, styles and languages; 
and 
 Sharing information through the media and social and political 
networks. 
Undertaking accountability 
engagements with governments 
 Using instruments such as scorecards, audits and budget analysis to 
engage with a government; 
 Making use of formalised spaces of participation; 
 Creating new spaces of participation; and 
 Mobilizing social protests. 
Using information from 
accountability engagements 
with governments 
 Following up on commitments through advocacy, lobbying and 
campaigning work. 
Source: UNDP, 2010 
Moreover, one of the fundamental issues that have been emphasized in development literature 
(Acemoglu & Robinson, 2013) is that social accountability work must be embedded within 
government institutions. This is particularly essential for fostering convivial working relationships 
among government institutions, non-state actors and the citizens. In the global South, particularly 
in Sub-Saharan Africa, the relationship between the citizenry and public institutions has been 
characterized by mutual suspicion and hatred (De Visser, 2005). This has militated against 
achieving optimal service delivery outcomes. The role of non-state actors (particularly civil society) 
in leveraging participatory local governance systems is extremely vital. Amongst the most 
essential characteristics that have been proposed by scholars (Charlick, 2001; Houtzager, Lavalle 
& Acharya, 2003; Johnson & Wilson 2000) to shape the behaviour of these organizations include, 
among others:  
 Legitimacy: the authority to speak on behalf of constituents, through open and accountable 
membership-based organizational structures; 
 Managerial capacity: to plan and administer activities with coherent objectives and strategies; 
 Advocacy capacity: to negotiate with and lobby government and to optimize the benefits of 
working in coalitions and networks; 
 Connection to networks and coalitions: to strengthen collective efforts and address them at 
different levels, to share information and to create inclusive action; 
 Information and knowledge capacity: to seek, create, interpret and learn from information 
in order to provide evidence that informs accountability claims; 
 Leadership: to build alliances and identify strategic entry points for engagement with 
government; and  
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 Independence: to be seen as separate from decision makers and politicians, basing claims on 
evidence rather than political party positions or other identities. 
Consequently, the need to either build wholesome or strengthen the existing capacity of civil 
society organizations to achieve positive governance transformation, as postulated by the Theory 
of Change, cannot be overemphasized.  
2.3.2 Social accountability tools 
A broad typology of social accountability strategies has been provided by UNDP. A 
threefold spectrum of criteria has been used by the institution to provide an in-depth understanding 
of local governance accountability systems. There are tools earmarked on sustaining social 
accountability at the Council level. These constitute the first category of accountability approaches 
and include tools such as, but not limited to, citizen juries, public hearings, study circles, virtual 
or online town hall meetings, appreciative inquiry summits, public forums and future search public 
workshops (UNDP, 2010; Gaventa & McGee, 2010). The second category relates fundamentally 
to financial management. Amongst the most common tools that constitute this nomenclature are 
public revenue monitoring, independent budget analysis, alternative budgets, public expenditure 
tracking surveys, community led procurement and participatory budgeting. Finally, UNDP also 
focuses on approaches aimed at monitoring the quality and reliability of public services. These 
include, inter alia, stakeholder surveys, citizen report cards, community scorecards, participatory 
output monitoring, social audits and citizens audits. Table 2 below is a summarized version of this 
social accountability taxonomy.  
Table 2: Social accountability tools 
Mechanism                     Description 
Citizen Juries  Citizen-based tools 
Composed of 12 to 24 randomly selected citizens, constitute a direct method for 
obtaining informed citizens' input into policymaking processes 
Public Hearings Usually conducted by public bodies (such as city councils, municipalities and planning 
commissions) either as a part of regular meetings or as special meetings to obtain public 
comment on particular governance issues 
Study Circles Comprise a small group of people who meet over a period of time to deliberate on critical 
public administration issues 
Public Forums Occur when a government opens its official meetings to the public to harness community 
input and concerns 
                                2.    Public Finance Accountability  
Public Revenue 
Monitoring 
Entails the tracking and analysis of the amount of revenue that a government (or Council) 
generates 
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Independent Budget 
Analyses 
Occur when a critical mass of stakeholders research, monitor and disseminate 
information about public expenditure and investments 
Public expenditure 
tracking surveys 
Track the flow of public funds to determine the extent to which resources actually reach 
the target groups 
Community-led 
procurement 
Enables local communities to participate in procuring public goods 
Participatory 
budgeting 
A process through which citizens participate directly in budget formulation, decision-
making and monitoring of budget implementation 
                                               3.Monitoring public services 
Stakeholder Surveys A range of techniques employed in mapping and understanding the perspectives of 
stakeholders with an interest in a particular policy reform programme by the government 
Citizen Report 
Cards 
Participatory surveys that seek to obtain user feedback on the performance of public 
services 
Citizen audits An information generating process that gathers evidence from citizens on the 
implementation of programmes and their social consequences 
Community 
scorecards 
Involve surveys of both citizens and service providers on their perceptions of the quality 
of services provided 
Social Audits Collecting information on the implementation of particular public services in relation to 
expected standards, usually by an independent organization 
Source: UNDP, 2010 
Figure 2 below illustrates the nexus between financial management and social accountability. 
   
 
2.3.2 Guiding principles and approaches 
  There are common methods that citizens use to track accountability and transparency of 
public entities that manage their affairs. These entail, among others, using judicial channels for 
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seeking legal redress; formal government structures and processes; citizen participation 
approaches; government policies; ICT-based; and traditional/conventional methods.  
Direct engagement  
Interaction among citizens, politicians and technocrats within local authorities is one 
proven mechanism for establishing transparent governance thresholds. Cornwall, Lucas and 
Pasteur (2000) state that individual citizens can petition local authorities and tender their 
complaints formally through the department that is responsible for public relations. This is often 
the office of the Ombudsman or its equivalent. Direct engagement offers citizens quicker and more 
effective response to their complaints.  
Legal recourse 
The law itself has become an essential tool that citizens can utilize to agitate for the 
fulfilment of their justiciable rights. For example, Nepal’s 2008 Good Governance Act stresses the 
significance of establishing a public administration regime that is ‘pro-people, accountable, 
transparent, inclusive and participatory’ (Malena & Tamang, undated).On the basis of this law, 
citizens can take a judicial approach to have their problems resolved by the responsible authorities.  
Utilizing government structures and processes 
Many governments establish structures within their governance systems to ensure social 
accountability. Claasen & Alpín-Lardiés (2010) are of the view that horizontal accountability is 
usually seen within the structures of the state (legislature, judicial bodies and ombudspersons) 
where it provides institutional checks and balances to guard against abuse of power by authorities. 
These structures also have departments that respond to citizens’ issues. 
Citizen participation as a conduit for fostering social accountability  
At the core of public administration is the need to ensure that citizens participate actively 
in how their affairs are managed by the authorities. Krisnna (2003) argues that social accountability 
mechanisms involve citizens seeking information from government (for example on budgetary 
issues) and in creating new information about access to and quality of services. Twawez (meaning 
‘We can make it happen’) is an example of citizen-led initiatives in East Africa established to 
trigger social action by enhancing citizen agency. In Bolivia, the Popular Participation Law of 
1993 attempts to decentralize power to the local level, where citizens would participate directly in 
governance (UNDP, 2013).  
Deliberate government policy 
Some governments formulate deliberate policies that foster social accountability and 
democratize governance systems making them responsive and transparent at both the local and 
national levels. Moldova, for instance, adopted an Open Government Data system which allows 
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open access to governmental information by its citizens. Citizen feedback approaches (including 
Grievance Redress Mechanisms) have been utilized to improve resource governance in different 
countries (World Bank, 2013). Thus, governments can positively steer the social accountability 
processes. 
Use of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT)  
 ICT-based social accountability approaches that have been utilized to improve governance 
include websites and portals, video conferencing, tele-centres, citizen service centres and 
electronic kiosks (World Bank, 2015). Mobile phone–based services using short messages, 
interactive voice recording and hand-held devices such as personal digital assistants are being used 
globally as social accountability mechanisms. In India, for example, CGNetSwara (a 
telecommunications company) provides the tribal population of Chhattisgarh with a voice-based 
portal through which they can report local issues to the responsible authorities using a landline or 
mobile phone and listen to other voice reports (ibid).  
2.4 A global synopsis 
Different parts of the world have made diverse strides in integrating social accountability 
as an invaluable aspect of their governance systems. This diversity is also shown in the different 
priority areas that are emphasized in the various parts of the world. A deep understanding of social 
accountability experiences across the globe is, therefore, essential to ensure learning and sharing 
of lessons as well as in replicating good practices. Recently, UNDP has studied the status of social 
accountability in different geospatial regions that constitute the world. Table 3 below summarizes 
the priorities and lessons that have been achieved in promoting social accountability globally. 
Table 3: A global overview of social accountability experiences 
Region  Priority issues 
 
Africa  
 Prioritizes adoption of new models for service delivery and for scaling up interventions that 
are effective; 
 Highlights importance of building capacity to strengthen MDG-based planning at all levels 
of government; and 
 Promotion of private sector, civil society involvement in efforts to achieve the MDGs 
Asia-Pacific    Prioritizes greater policy coherence, reducing corruption, strengthening regulations and 
increasing accountability and stakeholder participation  
Arab   Focuses on redressing gender inequality in the region (there is low participation of the 
feminine gender in decision-making processes in this region relative to the masculine one).  
Europe and 
Central Asia 
 Prioritizes building capacities to help governments shift from over-regulation to better 
regulation (including increasing the transparency and accountability of decision makers)  
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Latin 
America and 
Caribbean  
 
 Emphasizes the need to establish a new social covenant in which the government has a 
greater capacity to redistribute resources and advance equality; and 
 Empowerment  of women through meaningful participation in different decision-making 
spheres  
Source: UNDP, 2013 
2.4. 1. Civil society-driven social accountability systems in Africa 
The global South, particularly Sub-Saharan Africa, has been identified as a ‘hotspot’ of 
public maladministration, corruption and institutionalized disregard of principles of good 
corporate governance (Korten, 1987). The relatively dormant civil participation in this particular 
region of the world has been attributed to the high incidence of poverty. Many citizens (either as 
individual or households) are mostly preoccupied with livelihoods activities such as subsistence 
agriculture and informal sector initiatives. However, recent evidence has suggested that social 
accountability is gaining increasing momentum in the Third World (World Bank, 2015; UNDP, 
2013) Africans, through the emergency of a vibrant society, have begun taking a keen interest in 
how their affairs are managed by their respective governments. Service riots in some parts of 
Africa north of the Sahara have seen repressive regimes being overthrown. The ‘Arab Spring’ 
revolutions that led to the dethronement of despots in Libya, Tunisia and Egypt, often through 
violence, are classical cases in point.  Civic participation activities that have led to citizens 
confronting dictatorial administrative regimes have been escalated in some African countries such 
as Burundi and the Central African Republic. The role that civil society has played in 
democratising institutions of local government in African countries has, thus, been phenomenal. 
Table 4 summarizes key lessons and good practices that have been documented in some African 
countries.  
  
Table 4: Lessons and good practices from civil society-driven initiatives in Africa  
Civil Society Initiative Key Lessons 
Seeking Social Accountability from 
Provincial Government in South Africa 
 Strengthening and institutionalising social accountability must take cognisance of the context; 
 Support evidence-based social accountability monitoring with mass-based demands for improved service delivery; and 
 Confrontational and cooperative relationships with the government 
Ensuring Social Accountability in Times of 
Political Crisis in Kenya 
 Accountability requires a strong public voice and vibrant (and accountable) institutions and rules; and 
 Importance of the international community in promoting accountability 
Using the Media to Advance Social 
Accountability in Uganda 
 CSOs can make a significant contribution to media development through promoting citizen journalism; 
 They (CSOs) foster critical synergies with media moguls; 
 CSOs encourage journalistic specialisation through, for instance, running tailor-made courses; 
 Precision and concision in reporting are essential to provoke interest and research on a particular issue; and 
 Vibrant  communication strategies to disseminate strategic information are critical 
Enhancing Civil Society Capacity for 
Advocacy and Monitoring: Malawi’s Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Budget 
 Evidence-based advocacy is essential for fostering positive transformation; 
 Constructive criticism induces innovation and outcome enhancement; 
 Good rapport with strategic institutions (such as Parliament) needs to be promoted; 
 Synergistic and strategic alliances to enhance advocacy strategies; 
 Training on governance issues must be prioritized; and 
 On-going media advocacy on the budgetary issues is critical 
Participatory Budgeting in Fissel, Senegal  Testing alternative courses spurs innovation in financial management;  
 Collaborative approaches between the Councils and grassroots community organizations are critical in ensuring participatory budgeting;  
 Civil society (especially NGOs) reinforce the capacities, methods and techniques essential for effective stakeholders’ effective 
participation;  and 
 Mass communication strategies (in this case a local radio station) are essential tool for information dissemination 
Gender-Sensitive and Child-Friendly 
Budgeting in Zimbabwe 
 Action-oriented research, participatory budget analysis, lobbying and advocacy and partnerships escalate development potential  
Citizen Control Of Public Action: The Social 
Watch Network In Benin 
 Capacity-building, critical analysis and research, dialogue, advocacy, media relations and alliance building are pivotal for social 
mobilization 
Source: Adapted from: Claasen, Alpín-Lardiés& Ayer, 2010; McNeil &Malena, 2010 
  
 
To add on, other African countries have made significant strides in localizing the 
democracy agenda in terms of promoting citizen-based governance regimes. Clayton, Oakley and 
Taylor (2000) note that efforts have been made to ensure the transition of African countries from 
‘predatory nations’ toward ‘developmental states’ through media reforms, capacity building and 
fostering financial transparency. For instance, in Benin there has been increasing engagement 
among different stakeholders throughout the budget cycle processes. In the early 2000s, Benin 
witnessed escalating demand by CSOs for fiscal transparency and efficient public spending (World 
Bank, 2015). Elsewhere, funding mechanisms in Kenya to ensure money reaches targeted 
beneficiaries include the Constituency Development Fund (CDF), the Constituency AIDS Fund to 
fight HIV/AIDS and the Poverty Reduction Funds (ibid). Similarly, the Rural Electrification 
Programme Fund, the Free Primary Education Fund and the Youth Enterprise Development Fund 
have been sustained to promote the development of different sectors of the economy. 
2.4.2 The Asian Experience 
Various countries situated on the Asian block have had varying experiences in fostering 
social accountability as a key anchor of governance at both the national and local tiers of 
government. The Philippines, for example, has strengthened municipal accountability as part of 
responding to the current and emerging service delivery issues. In this country, UNDP and UN-
Habitat have partnered five municipal governments to implement the Citizen Action for Local 
Leadership Programme which promotes citizen engagement in urban governance. The State of 
Democracy Assessment Framework of the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral 
Assistance (IDEA) developed indicators to measure the extent of democratic governance in 
Mongolia (UNDP, 2013). Elsewhere, the 2008 Good Governance Act in Nepal stresses the need 
for a public administration regime that is ‘pro-people, accountable, transparent, inclusive and 
participatory’ (ibid). Thus, Asia has been a lead actor in promoting social accountability systems. 
2.5 The local context: The Zimbabwean dimension 
Zimbabwe, regarded by many (cf Makumbe, 2010; Mwando, 2008) as a pariah state, has 
been led, for nearly four decades since 1980, by Mugabe and his Zimbabwe African National 
Congress Patriotic Front (ZANU PF) party. Perceived by is foes as a dictator, Mugabe has presided 
over a nation that has morphed from being the ‘bread-basket’ of Africa in the 1990s to currently 
being a ‘basket case’ itself (ibid). The governance regime is centralist and commandist. Human 
rights are violated blatantly whilst extrajudicial killings sponsored by the state accompany 
electoral seasons (Human Rights Watch, 2015; Amnesty International, 2015). Social systems are 
virtually dysfunctional and the Cholera outbreak between 2008 and 2009 left in excess of 5 000 
people dead in the country 32 urban centres (Tibaijuka, 2005). Zimbabwe is ranked 156 out of 175 
highly corrupt countries in the 2014 Global Corruption Perception Index by Transparency 
International. Thus, the World Bank classifies her as a ‘fragile state.’  
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2.5.1 The socio-economic perspectives 
In the past two (2) decades, Zimbabwe has experienced severe and successive economic 
crises. These catastrophes have manifested through unemployment, hyperinflation, 
deindustrialization, rampant company closures and erosion of disposable incomes (World Bank, 
2015). According to the Zimbabwe 2014-2015 National Budget (2015) the country has an 
unsustainably high wage bill (standing at 81% of GDP in 2014). The local government sector has 
suffered critically leading to the provision of extremely poor quality and unreliable services by 
Councils. For instance, the quality of water supplied by the Harare City Council to consumers is 
certified unsafe by the World Health Organization [WHO] (Nhapi, 2009). The industrial sector, 
which traditionally has been one of the major public sector employers, currently operates at a 39% 
capacity utilization threshold.1  The regime’s adverse track-record of maladministering public 
affairs is well documented (Makumbe, 1998; Makumbe, 2010).  
Additionally, the successive economic crises have had adverse ramifications on the social 
front. As the citizens lack formal and gainful employment opportunities, social ills in order to eke 
a living have escalated. Prostitution has become extremely prevalent in Zimbabwe. This has 
fuelled the rapid spread of the HIV/AIDS pandemic leaving at least 15% of the national population 
infected and affected by the deadly virus (National AIDS Council, 2015). Juvenile delinquency is 
common across all the socio-economic strata of the Zimbabwean society. Crime has gone out of 
control. Drug abuse due to stress has reached unimaginable proportions. The social fabric that 
binds familial relations has broken down. Overcrowding in the high-density suburbs of urban 
Zimbabwe has led to a sharp increase in taboo cultural dynamics such as incest (Grey, 2012; UN-
Habitat, 2005). The level of extreme poverty prevalent in the country is too ghastly to contemplate. 
The Gini coefficient continues to widen. Corruption is now a way of life. Relational life has seen 
gender stereotypes aggravating. The net effect of these and other socio-economic occurrences has 
been the incapacitation of the local government system. 
2.5.2 Politico-institutional dynamics  
The primitive and partisan politics that have characterized national governance in 
Zimbabwe have had a devastating effect on the ability of public institutions to provide services in 
a sustainable manner. It is heartrending to note that the past three decades have been characterized 
predominantly by primitive politics in terms of public administration rather than a genuine 
commitment on the part of duty bearers to serve the nation. Partisan politics, which are often 
violent, have penetrated the whole social fabric of the Zimbabwean society. Professionalism in the 
local government sector has been blatantly disregarded (McGregor, 2013).  Thus, institutions of 
governance have been infiltrated by political opportunists. 
In addition, the regime regards civil society with contempt and as foes. For instance, 
Mugabe himself (referring to NGOs) once retorted in 2008, 
                                                          
1 (The NewsDay, June 9, 2015). 
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"We have now a phenomenon of NGOs, or shall I call them phenomena, for they really are a type 
of government in the background of a formal government. I don't know whether this creature is 
for the better or for the worse, but in our country we have seen a situation where they have 
exceeded their terms of reference, and perhaps we might have to reconsider the advisability of 
having NGOs"2 
 Thus, this statement coming from the executive head of state qualifies the widely held view that 
the ruling party is repressive and does not tolerate criticism. Consequently, this dents local 
governance. 
2.5.3 The Constitutional dispensation  
Zimbabwe commits to enhancing social accountability in municipal governance stating 
explicitly in the Constitution’s preamble ‘the need to entrench democracy, good, transparent and 
accountable governance... [and] commitment to upholding and defending human rights and 
freedoms.’ In Section 8:1 it (the Constitution) guides the state in ‘formulating and implementing 
laws that will lead to...a sustainable, just, free and democratic society.’ However, the regime 
(ZANU PF) has flagrantly violated the supreme law of the land. For example, one Information and 
Publicity Minister once chillingly warned,  
“I want to repeat that this country came about through the barrel of the gun. It cannot be taken by 
a pen, never, never, you can forget”3    
Thus, in order to realize the noble ideals of social accountability the rule of law would need to be 
exercised, and sustained, in Zimbabwe. 
                                                          
2 IRIN, July 29, 2009 
3 The DailyNews, May 13, 2015 
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2.5.4 Anchoring legislative environment and impact on social accountability 
The Urban Councils Act (Chapter 29:15) is the principal legislative instrument that guides 
urban governance in Zimbabwe. 
Section 288 of the Act specifically 
deals with financial management 
issues that the local authorities 
need to administer in an 
accountable and transparent 
manner as a means of fostering 
social accountability. This is 
particularly the functional 
obligation of the Finance 
Committee within the Council. 
The Act provides that the Councils 
must formulate their budgets 
(annual) through a consultative 
process that ensures the 
participation of residents. The 
Council must give a 30-day notice, 
in newspapers of sufficient 
circulation within its jurisdiction, 
to enable stakeholders to make their objections and representations concerning price regimes (of 
services) and any other salient budgetary issues. This legislative instrument, however, has been 
criticized (cf Davies, 2014; Makumbe 2010) for conferring the responsible Minister excessive 
powers in numerous ‘as he deems fit’ provisions. Thus, it needs to be repealed. 
Moreover, having realized that the local government sector is regulated by too numerous 
legislative instruments, central government decided, post adoption of the new Constitution, to 
amalgamate all the attendant laws into one Act. The ensuing legislative instrument is the Local 
Government Bill. It is yet to obtain Presidential Assent. Interestingly, the Bill has already been 
exposed to severe criticism by reformist local government scholars and practitioners (cf Davies, 
2014; Muchadenyika, 2014). Much of this criticism has emanated from the Bill’s silence on the 
importance of information dissemination by local governments to all actors whose interests are at 
stake in the service delivery programmes and approaches. Thus, the Bill requires further 
amendments before it can pass the ‘progressive legislative framework’ test. 
2.5.5 The Service Delivery Capacity Building Programme (2013) 
The Programme, a brainchild of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and 
the Ministry responsible for local governance, aims, among other things, to build the capacity of 
Councils to provide services in a sustainable manner. It is being implemented within the 
framework of the Zimbabwe United Nations Development Assistance Framework (ZUNDAF) 
Box 1: Proposed Local Authority Bill and Social Accountability 
a) Right to Information 
There is no mention of this critical clause in the Bill. Section 52 of the Bill 
removes the provision for under-camera meetings as contained in Section of 
87(2) of  the Urban Councils Act. Section 53(7) of the Bill maintains the 
secrecy of the minutes of any committee meetings.  The Council may even 
reconstitute itself as a committee to maintain secrecy of its internal operation 
which is an antithesis to transparency.  
b) Citizen Participation 
The Bill pays lip service to practical considerations of the notion participation. 
It alludes to the need for ‘consultations’ with residents without defining what 
this really entails. This is retrogressive. 
c) Objections by Residents 
The Bill empowers Councils to connive with the responsible Minister, to 
dismiss citizens’ objections (such as rates thresholds) without justification. 
d) Residents Associations 
There is neither mention nor legislative clauses for residents associations in 
the Bill. 
e) Accountability of Council authorities 
The Bill does not provide for increased transparency in the financial operations 
of local authorities nor specify penalties for failure to meet financial reporting 
requirements. 
 
Source: Adapted from Davies (2014) 
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Outcome 3. Among other focus areas, Outcome 3 seeks to achieve ‘enhanced accountability in the 
management of public resources and service delivery’ (Government of Zimbabwe & United 
Nations Zimbabwe, 2011). Perhaps one of the most essential outputs has been the production of 
the Councillor Induction Handbook (cf Chatiza et al, 2013) to educate elective Council officials 
on their mandate and the means of achieving it. Thus, the Programme is generally progressive in 
terms of addressing fundamental social accountability issues in urban governance in Zimbabwe. 
The local government system of Zimbabwe, in addition, is essentially bureaucratic. The 
MoLGNHPW is the central government institution that has the mandate of supervising Councils. 
Besides local authorities, the Constitution also creates Provincial and Metropolitan Councils as 
intermediaries between the centre and lower level governance structures. As the tier of government 
closest to the people, local authorities have the obligation of providing services to citizens resident 
in their areas in a sustainable manner. Whilst the Constitution recognizes that the administrative 
architecture at the governmental level must be a devolved one, in practice the centre still wields 
domineering power (Davies, 2014; Makumbe, 2010). The argument has been that the Councils are 
excessively overregulated which constrains their space for self-determination. Hence, the local 
government system in Zimbabwe remains volatile and performs sub-optimally. 
2.5.6 Devolution  
 For the first time in the history of Zimbabwe, the local government sector was officially 
recognized in the national Constitution in 2013. In particular, Section 274:1 proclaimed that ‘there 
shall be urban local authorities to represent and manage the affairs of the people.’ The preamble 
of Chapter 14 states that ‘the democratic participation in government by all citizens and 
communities of Zimbabwe’ must be guaranteed. It goes on to state in Section 265:1a that 
‘provincial and metropolitan councils and local authorities must...ensure good governance by 
being effective, transparent, accountable and institutionally coherent.’ In Section 266: 2 the 
Constitution unequivocally directs that ‘no employee of a provincial or metropolitan Council or a 
local authority [shall] ...act in a partisan manner, further the interests of any political party ... [or] 
violate the fundamental rights or freedoms of any person.’ Consequently, by legislating the 
existence of Councils (at both the provincial and local levels), the Constitution establishes a three-
tier local government system. Thus, theoretically, Zimbabwe should be a devolved state but 
whether this is obtaining at the practical level is beyond the scope of this researcher’s analysis. 
2.5.7 ‘Checks and balances’ institutions 
In order to ensure organizational efficiency of the institutions that are mandated, at law, to 
provide public services there is need for institutional ‘watchdogs’ to supervise them. There has 
been ‘institutionalized looting’ (corruption) of public resources at local government institutions 
(Kanyenze, Kondo, Chatambura & Martens, 2011). In order to respond to the cancerous corruption 
that has torn the local government sector, the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) and the Anti-
Corruption Commission (ACC) were formed to check financial excesses within public institutions. 
In spite of the noble intentions that informed their establishment, the two institutions have 
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themselves come under severe criticism. Critics (such as Freedom House, 2015) have alleged that 
the two institutions themselves are corrupt. Thus, as long as accusations of blatant violations of 
good governance principles by local government institutions continue, rejuvenating the sector will 
remain a pipedream.  
2.6 Civil society experiences in Zimbabwe 
In spite of the legislative restrictions and personal security risks associated with civil 
activities in Zimbabwe, several non-state agencies have played a fundamental role in agitating for 
accountable and transparent governance. A deeply dictatorial regime, Mugabe’s ZANU PF has 
progressively been succumbing to incessant pressure to democratize and revolutionize governance 
paradigms in the country. However, this transitional journey has left scores of civil activists, 
opposition members and anti-regime protesters imprisoned, violently attacked, maimed or, in 
many instances, killed (United States Department of State, 2008; Freedom House, 2015).  Several 
others have remained resolute and taken the regime head-on. Examples of such ‘brave’ civil 
society actors include, among others, the Harare Residents Trust (HRT), Combined Harare 
Residents Association (CHRA), the Zimbabwe Women’s Resource Centre and Network and the 
National Association of Non-Governmental Organizations (NANGO).  Thus, residents 
associations, special interest groups and other non-state actors continue to play a significant role 
in the democratization process. 
2.6.1 Residents’ associations 
HRT is one of the most vocal residents’ associations operating in Harare. It has a 
monitoring tool that tracks the social accountability processes within the Harare City Council. This 
tool is used to evaluate the quality, reliability and affordability of services provided by the local 
authority. The water barometer is another tool that it uses to track the quality of water provided by 
the Harare City Council (HRT, 2013). Combined Harare Residents Association (CHRA), an 
organization with affiliates from various neighbourhoods, has been vigilant in terms of getting the 
Council to account for the decisions they make in managing the city. The organization ‘condemned’ 
in the ‘strongest of terms’, in a press statement issued in 2011, ‘utterances’ in the media by the 
then Ambassador to China Chris Mutsvangwa to the effect that the Cholera pandemic of the 2008 
was a result of ‘illegal sanctions4.’ It protested,  
“We find these statements totally unacceptable, mischievous, ill-informed and absolutely 
irresponsible…It is quite appalling to realize that such a learned person like Mutsvangwa fails to 
                                                          
4 The United States of America imposed restrictive measures on Zimbabwe (through the Zimbabwe Democracy and 
Economic Recovery Act of 2001) as a result of blatant human rights abuses during the Fast Track Land Reform 
Programme. The Act forbids, in Article 4, USA officials within the Breton Woods institutions (the International 
Monetary Fund and the World Bank) as well as other multilateral funding agencies from supporting financial aid to 
Zimbabwe until it improves its ‘checkered human rights’ record. 
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realize that the Cholera outbreak was a crisis of failed governance by the then ruling party ZANU 
PF”5  
Hence, CHRA has contributed tremendously towards the realization of the social accountability 
agenda in Zimbabwe.   
2.6.2 Special interest groups 
An essentially gender-oriented organization, the Zimbabwe Women Resource Centre and 
Network has championed feminine issues in Zimbabwe. Even though the organization has 
encountered both political and cultural impediments to its work, it has been a key actor in agitating 
for gendered governance processes. Through its Gender Responsive Budgeting Programme that 
started in 2001, the organization has fiercely advocated against masculine traditions that have 
militated against effective female participation in governance at both the central and local tiers of 
the state. In a study carried out by ZWRCN in 2003, the organization concluded that the gendered 
roles (such as reproductive work and providing home-based care for the sick and the dying) that 
women perform are often overlooked and unaccounted for. Thus, ZWRCN continues to play a 
significant role in redefining the governance discourse from the gender vantage point.   
2.6.3 Non-state actors 
The National Association of Non-Governmental Organizations is the umbrella body of 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Zimbabwe. Through the Child Friendly Budgeting 
Programme, which began in 2000, NANGO has advocated vigorously for the integration of child 
issues in the governance processes. It argues that there should be progressive budgetary allocations 
to children’s issues from the national fiscus (NANGO, 2013). It held a Social Accountability 
Conference in 2007 which, among other things, aimed at revolutionizing the local government 
sector which was sinking into the doldrums then. The conference was run under the theme ‘Citizens 
have a right to demand accountability, Public actors have the obligation to be accountable to 
citizens.’ As is the case with other civil society organizations, NANGO has not been spared state 
brutality in terms of operational space. 
2.7 Chapter conclusion  
The essence of this chapter was to provide conceptual and contextual clarity to the notion 
of social accountability. A global synopsis of the experiences that nations have undergone in 
scaling up efforts to integrate social accountability as an invaluable tool for ensuring participatory 
and responsive development was provided in this chapter. The focus of the chapter then zoomed 
in to the local (Zimbabwean) level. Particular attention was given on the politico-institutional 
arrangements that have shaped the social accountability in Zimbabwe. The legislative (including 
constitutional) dispensation that regulates local governance within the context of urban areas in 
Zimbabwe was discussed and sufficiently critiqued. The next chapter discusses, albeit in brief, the 
                                                          
5 Nehanda Radio, August 11, 2011 
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methodological approaches that were used in generating data relevant to this study that are 
subsequently presented and analyzed in Chapter 4. 
 
  
CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
Qualitative researchers are interested in understanding the meaning people have constructed, that is, how 
people make sense of their world and the experiences they have in the world  (Merriam, 2009) 
3.0 Chapter introduction 
The preceding chapter gave clarity to the contextual and conceptual issues that affect 
the institutionalization and application of social accountability as a device for promoting 
participatory municipal governance at both the global and local levels. The attention of this 
chapter shifts to the methodological issues that guided the data generation process of this 
research. It begins by outlining the research design that informed the mechanisms through 
which relevant data in the research were generated. It subsequently engages in a discussion 
on the definition and tenets of the case-study approach that this research exudes. The target 
population of the study is discerned. The chapter goes further to elucidate how the sampling 
processes were carried out by detailing the attendant framework as well as how the relevant 
sample was drawn. This is followed by an analysis of how primary and secondary data, upon 
whose basis generalizations and conclusions were made, were generated.  
3.1 Methodological design 
A largely qualitative approach was adopted in assessing the status of social 
accountability in the delivery of services by the Harare City Council to residents within its 
jurisdiction. The tools used were modelled within the human rights framework. The focus 
areas that the tools sought to inquire included the participation of communities in the 
administration of the city of Harare and the local authority’s social accountability processes. 
An in-depth assessment of the Harare City Council’s capacity to foster social accountability 
in its service delivery models constituted the core of the data generation process. Furthermore, 
an evaluation of the relationship between citizens and the local authority was conducted as 
part of the study. An effort was made to ensure that the data generation methods were 
comprehensive and identified the strategic issues that the research sought to inquire. There 
was flexibility in the use of the methods. For instance, there were instances where covert and 
overt observation of social accountability processes by the Council necessitated the 
conducting of key informant interviews as a means for probity and clarity. Figure 2 below 
provides a summary of the main focus areas that informed the designing of the study 
methodology. 
Fig. 2: Substantive focus areas 
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3.2 Case study approach  
The research was essentially conducted within the framework of a case-study approach. 
A case study has succinctly been defined in development literature as an empirical 
investigation on a particular contemporary phenomenon in its real life context (Strauss, 1995; 
Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2009). Using the Harare City Council as the unit of analysis, 
the research studied the social accountability elements through a comprehensive description 
of the salient issues. An assortment of descriptive data generation approaches was triangulated 
to generate the relevant facts. This included the use of methods such as, inter alia, key 
informant interviews and questionnaires. A comprehensive analysis of relevant documents 
was done upon which summative conclusions and generalizations were made. Interestingly, 
the case study approach afforded this researcher the leeway to unpack the complexities that 
surrounded the social accountability discourse within the context of Harare. The case study 
was also deliberately chosen so that social accountability ‘strands’ would be specifically 
identified and analyzed in detail. It enabled this researcher to do a comparative analysis of 
the social accountability dynamics in study area (city of Harare) relative to sub-regional and 
global contexts. Thus, the case study approach constituted a solid foundation upon which 
social accountability issues in the area under review were analyzed. 
3.3 Target population 
A complex web of sector agencies and actors constitute the social accountability field 
in urban governance in Zimbabwe. Amongst the most fundamental actors whose interests  are 
at stake in the social accountability mechanisms and processes in the city of Harare include, 
but not limited to, the Harare City Council itself as the local authority, the MoLGNHPW as 
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the representative of the centre, the civil society and residents. Figure 3 below is a 
diagrammatic illustration of these interest holders. In this instance, the focus is solely on 
stakeholder mapping. The subsequent analysis presented in Chapter 4 examines further the 
synergistic relations amongst these actors and how they antagonise each other in practice in 
terms of leveraging social accountability processes in the city of Harare.  
Fig. 3: Stakeholder mapping of social accountability in Harare 
 
It is apt to point out here that this stakeholder mapping is exclusive. This researcher 
deliberately identified the local authority, the Ministry, civil society and citizens as the core 
actors in the social accountability processes in Harare. This was done solely for analytical 
purposes. However, there is also a litany of other non-state and non-civil society actors that 
play a critical role in social accountability dynamics who were deliberately excluded from 
this itemization for the reason outlined above. One such actor is the commercial sector (for 
instance, banks, real property sector and private companies). In spite of this exclusivity, this 
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researcher contends that adequate data were generated from among the identified stakeholders 
for purposes of analysis of the particular issues of inquiry in the research. 
3.4 Sampling framework and approaches 
As a starting point it is, again, essential to re-emphasize the research geopolitical 
boundaries as had been attempted in the introductory chapter. In terms of the Constitution of 
Zimbabwe, there are two (2) urban- and eight (8) rural provinces in Zimbabwe. The Harare- 
and Bulawayo Metropolitan Provinces constitute the two (2) urban provinces. This research 
is located within the former. More importantly, the Harare Metropolitan Province itself 
comprises three (3) semi-autonomous local authorities namely the Harare City Council, 
Chitungwiza City Council and Epworth Local Board (Zimbabwe National Statistics Agency 
Report, 2013). According to the 2012 National Census Report the two (2) cities, Chitungwiza 
and Harare, and the local board, Epworth, had a combined population of  2 098 199 then. Due 
to the smaller size of the province, in demographic terms, there have been spirited lobby 
efforts by lead local government researchers (Chatiza et al, 2013; Davies, 2014) to have the 
province managed under a single authority. The pros and cons of such a governance structure 
are beyond the focus of this paper. Zooming in to the specific area of study, the Harare City 
Council jurisdiction was the target space of this research.  
In addition, the city-proper (Harare) comprises five (5) districts/regions and 144 
formally planned residential suburbs. In addition, there are approximately sixty-three (63) 
slum areas in and around the city’s greenbelt (Dialogue on Shelter, 2014). One-fifth (or 20%) 
of suburbs in each of the districts were sampled. In addition, twelve (12) informal settlements 
also constituted a significant part of the sample population in this study. Six (6) research 
assistants (five responsible for districts and one for slum settlements)  volunteered to assist 
this researcher in generating data. The data generation process was conducted within one (1) 
month (February, 2016). Efforts were made to ensure that the data generated were 
comprehensive and generalizable to the wider urban context in Zimbabwe. A countrywide 
tour of all thirty-two (32) urban centres in the country was both impractical and financially 
onerous for the purposes of this paper. Nonetheless, Harare presents a strategic case from 
where general conclusions on the need to institutionalize social accountability in urban areas 
in Zimbabwe can be drawn. 
More so, in order to justify the sample size it was essential to discern the estimated 
number of people living in Harare. The World Population Review estimated, in 2014, that the 
city had 1.56 million people. Again generating opinions from each of these residents was 
impossible. Consequently, 600 questionnaires were administered to residents in the five (5) 
residential regions plus the selected informal settlements in the city of Harare. This was done 
through systematic random sampling in the formally planned settlements where the tenth 
household of each particular household was administered with the questionnaires. The first 
sample was randomly selected at the discretion of the research assistant. The conducting of  
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key informant interviews with the Council, Ministry and civil society (in this case, HRT and 
ZWRCN) was done through purposive sampling. This researcher took absolute control of 
holding key informant interviews. In some instances, the interviewees would identify and 
recommend other strategic informants who this researcher would, in turn, interview (snowball 
sampling). The data generation process was essentially an intensive process and many insights 
relevant to the study were learnt. Consequently, the data analysis process required sheer 
precision which this researcher abundantly exudes. 
3.5 Generating primary data 
As part of generating primary data relevant to the study, this researcher held key 
informant interviews with officials from both the state and non-state agencies. With the 
assistance of research assistants, considerable primary data were also generated through 
questionnaire administration to 600 households. This researcher also held six (6) focus group 
discussions in the sampling areas. By attending full Council meetings, which are open to the 
public in Zimbabwe at law, this researcher was also able to covertly observe the local 
authority’s social accountability processes.  
3.5.1Key informant interviews and institutional self-assessments 
Key informant interviews were held with officials from the Council and Ministry 
(departmental level) as well as from HRT and ZWRCN.  The interviews were facilitated 
through a key informant guide (see Annex 1) which focused on the interviewees’ 
understanding of social accountability conceptual and contextual issues; the legal framework; 
issue identification, filtration and definition; obtaining citizen-local authority relations and 
broader engagement processes and capacity building needs. The institutional self -assessment 
forms (see Annex 2) were administered together with the conducting of the interviews. These 
differed from questionnaires in that they afforded the respondents to specifically introspect in 
terms of their capacity issues. Specifically the form comprised ten (10) questions which 
focused, among other things, on organizational core competencies; social accountability 
experiences and challenges, processes and tools; operational frameworks and capacity needs. 
3.5.2 Focus group discussions 
This researcher considered it particularly essential to generate demand-side data. As 
the ultimate clientele of service delivery programmes, the communities constitute a 
fundamental actor in urban governance by the Harare City Council. They are the rights -
holders who reserve the right to demand the observance, recognition and fulfilment of rights 
in relation to service delivery issues from the local authority. The Council is essentially the 
duty-bearer with a lawful responsibility to respond to the rights of the residents through 
efficient and effective service delivery programmes. This research utilized public spaces in 
the targeted areas to hold discussions with the interested citizens. Whilst the focus group 
discussions generated considerable and relevant data to the issues under review, in some 
instances there was the challenge of the ‘maverick voice.’ This occurred where individual 
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member(s) tended to dominate the discussions. However, this research steered the discussions 
expertly and ensured that all discussants were afforded the opportunity to air their grievances. 
A focus group discussion guide (see Annex 3) was used to direct the discussions.  
3.5.3 Questionnaires 
Questionnaires were administered to 600 households as part of generating data 
relevant to the research. Considerable efforts were made in this research to ensure that the 
questionnaires (see Annex 4) inquired a broad range of issues on the social accountability 
discourse within the context of Harare. Even though it (the questionnaire) was comprehensive, 
this researcher deliberately used comprehensible language to ensure that the respondents  
understood what the data generating tool sought to inquire. Where possible this researcher 
avoided the use technical jargon which, ordinarily, the layman could not understand. Among 
the challenges that were encountered in the administration of the questionnaire was the refusal 
to participate in the process by some residents, non-response, biased responses and logistical 
issues. In spite of these challenges, however, relevant data were generated through 
questionnaires. 
3.5.4 Observation  
Full Council meetings in Zimbabwe are open to the public. However, the public attend 
as ex officio guests forbidden from participating actively in the discussions. This researcher 
attended two (2) full Council meetings throughout the data generation phase of this research. 
Covert and overt observations were made on the processes that the Council utilizes in 
fostering social accountability within its operational frameworks. This researcher also 
attended community meetings by six (6) Councillors as an observer in a covert manner. In 
addition, this researcher also attended a community sensitization meeting by the HRT. Table 
5 below is a summary of the models that were used in generating primary data in this research. 
Table 5: Data generation approaches 
Tool  Data source Quantum  
Focus group discussions Harare residents 154 discussants (97 female) 
Key informant interviews Harare City Council officials 3 (1 elective official, 2 appointive 
staff members) 
 MoLGNHPW,  1 
HRT  1 
 ZWRCN 2 
Questionnaire  Residents  600 (449 female) 
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Institutional self-assessment 
form 
Harare City Council 3 
MoLGNHPW 1 
HRT 1 
ZWRCN 2 
Observation  Harare City Council Full Council 
Meetings 
2 
Harare City Council Community 
Outreach (by Councillors) 
6 
HRT 1 
Source: Fieldwork, 2016 
3.6 Secondary literature Review 
A comprehensive review of literature was done to provide conceptual and contextual 
insights on the institutionalization of social accountability processes within the city of Harare. 
In Chapter 14 the Constitution of Zimbabwe explicitly provides that citizens have an 
inalienable right to participate in local governance. In the same vein, principal pieces of 
legislation (notably the Urban Councils- and the Regional Town and Country Planning Acts) 
that regulate urban governance in Zimbabwe were reviewed. The Local Government and 
Provincial and Metropolitan Bills (current awaiting parliamentary scrutiny and presidential 
assent) provide governance frameworks that should guide institutionalization of social 
accountability in public institutions. At the Ministry level, policies and guidelines in relation 
to the notion of social accountability were evaluated. Within the Harare City Council, this 
researcher reviewed reports, memoranda, circulars, correspondence and meeting minutes and 
assessed their relevance to social accountability institutionalization. The local authority’s 
Strategic Plan was analyzed to discern its short to medium term vision in fostering 
accountable and transparent governance. Strategic documents from international development 
organizations (such as UNDP and the World Bank) were examined and provided a 
comprehensive framework for assessing social accountability mechanisms. Global good 
practices on social accountability were learnt. For the HRT and ZWRCN, this researcher 
focussed on their evaluation reports, press releases and strategic plans. Thus, adequate 
secondary literature were reviewed and constituted an essential component of the data 
generation processes.   
3.7 Data Analysis and Presentation 
The analysis of data in this research was thematic and/or issue-based. The analysis was 
done within a broader framework that sought to respond to the objectives of the research. 
Specifically, the thematic issues covered areas such as the obtaining citizen-Council relations; 
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social accountability processes and mechanisms; institutional capacity;  social accountability 
programming and alternative frameworks for building organizational effectiveness in 
contributing to optimal social accountability outcomes. On the basis of the research tools and 
explicit study needs, subthemes or indicators were developed under each particular theme. 
The findings are presented in the ensuing chapter to fulfil each of the research objectives. The 
recommendations are given based specifically on the salient study findings. More importantly, 
an effort was made to proffer context-specific recommendations. Consequently, broader 
generalizations were minimized.    
To add on, an analysis of the organizational strengths, limitations, prospects and risks 
of each of relevant institutions was conducted. The overarching goal of this approach was to 
identify the capacity issues, at the institutional level, that the identified actors face in 
adequately institutionalizing social accountability mechanisms. It is on the basis of this 
analysis of institutional capacity issues that relevant lessons and good practices were drawn 
for learning and replication. Furthermore, emphasis was placed on identifying the structural 
causes and effects of institutional underperformance in terms of steering social accountability 
issues in urban governance in the city of Harare. Alternative courses of action to respond to 
these institutional challenges were suggested and are presented in the last chapter of this 
research report. Thus, an analysis of the institutional arrangements of the agencies that drive 
the social accountability processes in Harare constituted a fulcrum of this research.   
3.8 Ethical considerations and study limitations 
This researcher made considerable efforts to ensure that the generation of data was 
done within the acceptable limits of professional research. Attempts were made to ensure that 
research participants volunteered information willingly without undue duress. The team 
explained the essence of the research to the participants prior to discussions. This researcher 
was solely responsible for organising focus group discussions and key informant interviews. 
It was ensured that the discussions were interactive and did not degenerate into impromptu or 
normative lectures of how the citizens are supposed to participate in local governance. This 
researcher spent the greater part of the discussions listening to the concerns of the residents. 
In order to avoid the ‘maverick voice’, this researcher utilized facilitative skills to ensure 
broad participation by all discussants. The essence of the study was thoroughly explained to 
the discussants and, indeed, all informants who took part in this research. There was no 
financial or material reward given to informants. They (the participants) volunteered 
information out of their own volition. Thus, reasonable ethical parameters were observed 
during the data generation phase of this research.  
An array of operational and administrative challenges was encountered in this study 
that could affect, albeit marginally, the credibility of the data generated. Foremost amongst 
the latter was the debilitating administrative burden of managing documents in the study. It 
was solely the responsibility of this researcher to ensure that the completed questionnaires 
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were kept safely and not misplaced. In addition, questionnaires administered in the same area 
had to be kept together for ease of analysis. Second, the research entailed considerable 
financial costs to meet the expenses of printing the relevant materials as well as catering for 
the daily allowances of the research assistants. Considering that the research was not funded, 
this researcher met all the attendant costs from limited savings available. Third, logistical 
challenges were also encountered as the research assistants and this researcher had to use 
public transport for mobility in the study area. This was very inconvenient. Fourth, securing 
interviewees with some key informants was particularly onerous as some of them cited busy 
schedules and mundane bureaucratic protocols. This required sheer determination on the part 
of this researcher. Fifth and finally, mobilizing communities for the focus group discussions 
required tact and this researcher had to identify focal persons (particularly Councillors) to 
organize the events. Notwithstanding these challenges, the processes of data generation were 
intellectually stimulating, interesting and enjoyable.  
3.9 Chapter conclusion 
The essence of this chapter was to discuss the methodological foundations that guided 
the generation of the relevant data in the research. The research design was purely qualitative. 
Sampling was done purposively where this researcher deliberately chose key informants to 
inform the study. Through a snowballing approach, the key informants identified other 
strategic actors in the social accountability realm that this researcher, in turn, interviewed. 
Both primary and secondary data were generated in this study. The former was obtained 
through the use of key informant interviews, covert and overt observation, questionnaires and 
focus group discussions. Text- and non-text based sources of information were reviewed to 
generate secondary data. In addition, internet surfing played a key role in terms of generating 
secondary data in this research. The data were analysed through an issue- and/or theme-based 
approach. This enabled this researcher to pay attention to detail and analyze the salient issues 
under review. The data generation phase of the research was also blighted by a range of 
operational and administrative challenges. However, this researcher effectively manoeuvred 
past these obstacles. It is also instructive to point out that the process of generating data in 
this research was done in an ethical manner. Thus, credible data were obtained. The ensuing 
chapter presents and analyzes these data.  
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CHAPTER 4: DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS   
“The suspension of the Town Clerk [Harare City Council] comes…amid reports  the city’s 18 directors were 
gobbling  over half a million [US] dollars in salaries every month at a time service delivery has plummeted to 
levels where Council fails to replace street light bulbs.” The Herald, February 3, 2014 
4.1 Chapter introduction 
In the preceding section of the report this researcher focuses on the methodological 
framework that guided the data generation processes that inform this research. This part 
presents the key findings of the research. Specifically, this section provides an analysis of 
the obtaining citizen-Council relations; the local authority’s social accountability policy 
and practice and the attendant frameworks for institutionalizing participatory governance.  
4.2. Obtaining social accountability policy and practice 
The existing citizen-Council relations in Harare can best be analyzed from two (2) 
vantage points. First, the engagement between the local authority and residents can best 
be conceptualized as evolutionary and dynamic. An analysis of case histories of ‘senior’6 
residents in the city intimates that the relationship has undergone cycles of ‘love-and-hate’ 
dynamics. The two protagonists’ current relationship is one characterized by mutual hatred 
and suspicion. Second, the role that civil society has played, in terms of ingraining 
participatory governance in the city that is responsive to residents’ rights, also warrants 
analysis. Civil society organizations continue to play a critical role in ensuring that 
Council’s service delivery programming becomes participatory and inclusive (of the 
multiple, and often conflicting, interests that are at stake). They (the civil society) have 
acted as an essential linkage between the ‘downtrodden’ residents and the ‘predatory’ 
Council. Interviews with HRT and ZWRCN staff members revealed that 
institutionalization of social accountability policies and practices is still perceived as 
‘alien’ within the Harare City Council. The Council, they contend, feels as if it is being 
benevolent in providing services, albeit sub-optimally, to citizens yet it is their lawful 
obligation (in terms of the Constitution of Zimbabwe) to do so. Table 6 depicts the 
obtaining citizen-Council engagement processes and mechanisms within the jurisdiction 
of the city of Harare. 
 
                                                          
6 This researcher uses this term casually to refer to residents of the city, not less than eighty (80) years old, 
who have entirely spent their adult life in Harare 
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Table 6: Citizen-Council engagement processes and mechanisms 
Region Sampled suburbs  Key engagement processes & mechanisms 
Northern  Alexandra Park; Gunhill and Mount 
Pleasant 
Budget Consultations, Councillor Ward Meetings, Residents Associations’ 
Outreach 
North-Eastern Ballantyne Park; Mandara; Hatcliffe; 
Highlands; Rhodesville and 
Chishawasha Hills 
Complaints Desk, Expenditure Tracking 
Eastern Mabvuku; Msasa and Tafara Routine and periodic road maintenance, Clean-up Campaigns 
Southern (incl. 
South-Eastern 
and South-
Western) 
Braeside; Budiriro Glen Norah; Glen 
View; Hatfield; Highfield and Mbare 
SMEs, Community Public Health Campaigns, Crime Control 
Western (incl. 
North-Western) 
Avonlea Dzivaresekwa; Kambuzuma; 
Kuwadzana; Mufakose and Budiriro 
Housing Cooperative Schemes, Underground and Overhead Trunk 
Infrastructure 
Slum 
settlements  
Hopley; Hatcliffe Extension; Cassa 
Banana and Dzivarasekwa Extension  
In-situ Slum Upgrading Initiatives, Personal, Household and Community 
Hygiene Campaigns 
Source: Fieldwork, 2016 
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4.2.1 Customer discrimination in service delivery 
This research found nuanced and context-specific citizen-Council engagement 
processes in Harare.  In other words, there is a fundamental difference between how the 
Council engages with the wide spectrum of residents in Harare based on the socio-
economic and political strata they (the citizens) belong. The generated data show, on the 
one hand, that the ‘affluent’ residents in the northern suburbs of the city wield considerable 
politico-economic power which they use in the bargaining processes of negotiating for 
responsive governance by the Council. On the other hand, the data also reveal that citizens 
in the western suburbs, which are predominantly low income, feel the Council does not 
respond to their social accountability concerns in the same manner the local authority does 
to their northern counterparts. Ironically, besides waste collection and physical 
infrastructural (such as roads) services, the northern residents consume comparatively less 
Council services than those in other suburbs. This is because they (approximately 80% of 
the households) now meet their own service delivery needs due the Council’s inabili ty or 
unwillingness to do so. However, the Council is using budget consultations, albeit citizens 
rubberstamping technocratic budgetary propositions, to reach out to residents. Anecdotal 
evidence from senior citizens’ case histories revealed that residents loathe this mechanism 
of engendering participatory governance. Hence, scaling up institutionalization of social 
accountability by merely consulting residents as a way of fulfilling legal obligations in 
terms of urban governance laws is unlikely to be viable.  
In addition, the data show that slum upgrading and participatory community 
planning is slowly fostering inclusive municipal governance in slum settlements such as 
Dzivarasekwa Extension and Hopley. Through the Harare Slum Upgrading Programme 7 
the Council has begun, since 2012, to interface with slum dwellers who had been entirely 
ignored in the service delivery programming processes. However, it is instructive to point 
out here that this engagement has essentially been top-down. Strictly speaking, the Council 
has perceived the ultimate recipients of the programme (the poor slum dwellers) as mere 
beneficiaries rather than partners in the development processes. Whilst in areas that were 
sampled ward meetings by Councillors have been the main interaction medium between 
the residents and the local authority, these are not only infrequent but are also not 
deliberative.  The data reveal that about 82% of these meetings do not deliberate 
adequately on residents’ issues but are merely political mobilization processes. As one 
focus group discussant aptly puts it:  
“We stay with the Councillor here but the meetings that he has been calling this year have 
been empty. I suspect he is simply mobilizing us for political reasons. Mind you, 2018 
[next local government elections] is now by the corner.”  
                                                          
7 This is a multi-actor low income housing delivery initiative that is financially being supported by the Bill and 
Melinda Gates Foundation under the auspices of the Global Governance Programme on Inclusive Cities.  Similar 
programmes are being implemented in four (4) other African cities namely Luanda (Angola), Cairo (Egypt), 
Monrovia (Liberia) and Lilongwe (Malawi). 
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This constituency in the eastern part of the city (Tafara) has gone for more than five years 
without access to municipal water services8. According the information generated from 
the focus group discussion there, the area is a ‘political hot-potato’ that has been 
characterized by incessant interparty political violence. Thus, politicians have begun 
mobilizing their supporters to the detriment of bona fide social accountability processes. 
Fig. 4: Case history 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.3 The role of civil society organizations in fostering social accountability 
From a context-specific perspective, civil society organizations have played a 
fundamental role in efforts aimed at institutionalizing social accountability processes in 
the Council. The HRT revealed that the main conduits that the organization uses  in its 
efforts to foster participatory and inclusive urban governance in Harare include, among 
others, basic service delivery monitoring and community based planning. In addition, the 
organization continues to mobilize its members to participate in budgeting and expenditure 
tracking as well as monitoring. However, as one Council official working in the finance 
department concedes, the local authority has been fundamentally ineffective in terms 
fostering accountable and transparent financial management. This mainly relates to the 
flouting of the 30-70% expenditure threshold9 between remuneration and service delivery 
costs respectively. The official admitted that the Council expenditure threshold is salary-
driven and he estimated that more than 80% of the generated revenue is spent on paying 
salaries of mostly the higher level departmental managers and senior staff members. 
                                                          
8 The Zimbabwe Independent, July 31, 2015; The Daily News, March 28, 2015; The Financial Gazette, July 3, 
2014 
9 In terms of the governing Act, Councils are not supposed to use more that 30% of their revenue on meeting 
remuneration obligation. The official estimates that the Council spends 80% on salaries 
What is life like in the slums of Harare?: Anecdotes of a senior citizen (aged 87) from Hopley Slum 
Settlement 
“I do not know when exactly I was born. I think it was in 1928, 1929 or 1930 here in Harare [then Salisbury] 
in here in Zimbabwe. My polygamous father was a migrant worker working in [one of the] industries. I am a 
qualified boiler operator. I worked for 46 years until 1992 when I lost my sight. I saved a lot of money as a 
worker with my late first wife. We completed our house in Mbare in the 1990s. Unfortunately, it was 
demolished by the government [possibly during the urban ‘clean-up’ exercise by government in 2005]. The 
house was big and had three rooms in total. I lived there with my two wives and eight children. My first wife 
died in 2007. I am now living with my [other] wife and two grandsons in this shack. All my children, except 
two, are dead.    As you can see my shack is made of scrap plastic. I am sure these people [government] will 
come again [to demolish the structure]. My lease agreement is not yet processed because I do not have the 
US$52 payment required per year. My grandsons are not going to secondary school and support us through 
their firewood vending business. Since I started staying here I have never seen these [Council] people here as 
we used to in Mbare. They should come and see us lest we die of hunger here. My grandson has also married 
a poor daughter of Mai Tendai [neighbor]. I don’t know what will happen. My wish is for Council people to 
come and give us food here as what an [unnamed] NGO had been doing. In Mbare Council had several beer 
outlets but here there is none. Our water is from this shallow [unprotected] well. My wife is down with a 
disease due to this water. She is asleep in there.” 
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Predictably, this illegal expenditure anomaly has attracted fierce media condemnation10. 
The data from the multiple sources that inform this research also corroborate corruption 
allegations raised by the media against the Council. Thus, financial mismanagement 
continues to be an area that the residents feel short-changed by the local authority.  
Institutionalization of social accountability within the Harare City Council, the 
ZWRCN contends, is a fairly new phenomenon. The organization rated the Council’s 
ability to internalize social accountability very lowly. An official from the organization 
(ZWRCN) said the capacity of Council to steer participatory and inclusive governance is 
‘extremely low.’ She argues that Council outreach programmes meant to harness the 
participation of city residents in both modelling service delivery approaches as well as 
suggesting alternative courses of action to implement them has not ‘matured even 35 years 
after attaining political 
independence.’ She goes further to 
state that the Council has not 
adequately gendered its service 
programmes to ensure that they 
dovetail well with the concerns of 
the feminine gender. The key 
informant cites the 
disproportionately fewer number of 
female workers across all levels 
(whether managerial or 
operational) of the organizational 
structure of the Harare City 
Council as a classical case in point. 
This is despite that the feminine 
gender outnumbers the masculine 
one (51:49% respectively). Thus, institutionalization of social accountability policy and 
practice within the Council administrative and operational architecture, she suggests, will 
need to incorporate gender concerns. Table 7 below summarizes civil society activities for 
engendering participatory urban governance in Harare. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
10 The Herald (September 13,  2014); The NewsDay (January 28, 2014); ZimEye (February 26, 2014), Nehanda 
Radio (February 11, 2014); NewZimbabwe (February 5, 2014)  
Fig.5, ZWRCN: Gender perspectives to social 
accountability 
I. Gender responsive service delivery; 
II. Feminization of poverty; 
III. Capacity building of public organizations; 
IV. Knowledge generation and sharing; 
V. Participation of women in all spheres of life; 
VI. Coalition building; and 
VII. Research, advocacy and lobbying   
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Table 7: Civil society social accountability engagements 
Source: Fieldwork, 2016 
As part of advocating for the internalization of social accountability processes within the 
Council, civil society institutions utilize an array of approaches. These include gender 
watch group platforms, community scorecards, services survey satisfaction surveys, 
stakeholder surveys and petitions as shown by Table 8 below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Organization  Focus Areas 
Media Monitoring Project 
Zimbabwe (MMPZ) 
 Inclusive and participatory urban governance; 
 Gendered service delivery programming; 
 Justiciable rights promotion and observation in programming; 
 Scaling up delivery of social services at ‘user-friendly’ price regimes; and 
 An enabling legislative framework for people-centred development trajectories. 
Combined Harare 
Residents Association 
(CHRA) 
 
 
 Transparency and accountability and allocative efficiency in resource management at 
Council level; 
 Responsive service delivery; 
 Community-based development planning and implementation; 
 Participatory budget tracking and monitoring; and 
 Democracy and community mobilization 
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Table 8: Civil society social accountability tools and approaches in Harare, Zimbabwe 
Tool Organization  Key issues and effectiveness 
Social Service Charter Combined Harare Residents Association (CHRA)  Affordable, high quality and regular municipal services;  
 Client (residents) satisfaction; 
 Participatory and inclusive governance;  
 Local government sector reform; and  
 Confrontational in terms of approach 
Advocacy and lobbying National Association of Non-Governmental 
Organisations (NANGO) 
 Child-centred budgeting; 
 Responsive governance; 
 Rationalization of legal frameworks; 
 Good practices replication and organizational learning; and 
 Internal coordination and consensus building among members 
Sensitisation meetings ActionAid International Zimbabwe (AAIZ)  Gender perspectives to social accountability institutionalization;  
 Community mobilization and enhancement of active citizenry; 
 Egalitarian service delivery approaches; 
 Rights-based development programming; and  
 Political impediments to outreach 
Corruption investigations Transparency International Zimbabwe (TIZ)  Building integrity systems; 
 Systems-oriented good governance mechanisms; 
 Volatile and repugnant political context; 
 Does not ‘name names’ which is a strategic weakness; and  
 Skewed towards national rather than local level governance  
Source: Fieldwork 2016 
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4.3.1 Context specificity in utilization of tools 
Again, and as elucidated above, the effectiveness of 
approaches in Table 8 is context-specific. For instance, 
despite CHRA’s utilization of bench-marks in fostering 
responsive service delivery, mobilizing communities to 
partake in this endeavour is risky. The organization has 
often been accused of playing politics by masquerading as 
change agents in the local government reform process. More 
importantly, the residents themselves are especially 
unwilling to participate in processes that endanger their 
personal security due to vindictive political context. This 
researcher emphasizes, again, that the relationship between 
the Council and the residents is characterised by mutual 
suspicion and hatred. That the state itself, at the macro-level, 
has an awful human rights record11   further buttresses the 
unwillingness of residents to participate actively in local 
government affairs fearing for their security. Apparently the 
frontline professionals themselves, just as their political 
counterparts, in the Harare City Council also do not have a 
convivial relationship with the residents. The recent 
suspension of the Town Clerk at the behest of residents 
(through their political representatives, the Councillors) 
serves to illustrate this point. Ordinarily, Council appointive 
staff members are supposed to be servants of the residents 
as a matter of global good practice. In Harare, however, the 
obtaining situation is that the professionals do not tolerate 
bona fide criticism from residents. They (the workers) 
perceive performance appraisal by the communities as a 
threat to their job security. The most obvious shield they 
have used to rebuff this criticism is the use of regulatory 
and/or guiding local government laws to justify their 
incompetence. This researcher contends that the current 
reform of the local government legislative framework must 
serve as an essential conduit for institutionalizing social 
accountability processes as well as enhancing the 
performance of professionals. 
4.4 Inhibitive partisan politics 
Having largely focussed on social accountability practice in Harare, it is essential 
to look at the policy side. This should be done through an evaluation of the politico-
legislative environment. Domination of one party (ZANU PF) in the political terrain, the 
                                                          
11 The NewsDay May 18, 2015; The Human Rights Watch, March 8, 2011;  The Standard, June 7, 2015; The 
Independent, January 17, 2009;  BBC News, March 12, 2007 
Fig. 6: Hostility between 
Council appointive staff and 
residents (Case of Street 
Vending) 
Following a government 
moratorium on street vending, 
there were violent clashes between 
vendors and municipal police on 
July 9, 2015 in Harare’s CBD. The 
straw that broke the donkey-back 
came as the Council staff began 
dismantling makeshift vending 
stalls belonging to vendors. About 
26 vendors were arrested, brought 
before the courts and fined US$25 
each. The municipal police applied 
excessive force (indiscriminately 
beating vendors and passersby 
with baton sticks) in a bid to 
control the restive crowds. The 
National Vendors Union of 
Zimbabwe national director 
lament:  
“Six of them [vendors] were 
injured, one serious, I think he was 
hit with a blunt object.”  
The local authority, through its 
principal communications officer, 
however, vowed:  
“There is no going back…There 
were skirmishes in the morning 
caused by people refusing to 
adhere to the city bylaws.”  
 The callous eviction of these 
breadwinners (vendors) in a 
country whose unemployment rate 
is in excess of 90% was justifiably 
roundly condemned by local and 
international media organizations 
and human rights houses. 
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repressive legislative regime and the stifling of the emergence of a vibrant civil societ y 
sector have all militated against the achievement of optimal social accountability outcomes. 
The history of state brutality on civil practices further aggravates the already fragile local 
government sector in Zimbabwe. A cursory review of the case histories generated as part 
of this research shows that citizens fear political institutions (both at local and national 
level). Ghastly narrations, during fieldwork, of how some residents have ‘disappeared 
permanently’ due to their political activism for national and local governance reform 
justify the unwillingness of citizens to hold those who lead them to account. Archaic and 
restrictive laws (such as Public Order and Security- and Access to Information and 
Protection of Privacy Acts) have often been used by the authorities to deny citizens of 
their bona fide civil liberties and freedoms. For example, community mobilization requires 
lengthy bureaucratic protocols that often yield no meaningful results. The police authority 
that is supposed to grant ‘clearance’ for citizens to organize themselves to undertake civil 
activities has been alleged to be subservient to the state. Allegations have bordered on that 
the authority dabbles in politics, is partisan and ‘ruthlessly crashes’ civil processes12. This, 
therefore, has an adverse impact on efforts aimed at institutionalized social accountability 
in local governance.   
However, the enduring resolve by citizens to demand accountability from duty 
bearers (Harare City Council in this case) cannot be overemphasized. Evidently, by 
strengthening the capacity of civil society through, for example, legal reform, there is 
scope for institutionalizing social accountability. Undoubtedly, such capacity is critical 
for ‘enabling the poor to monitor and discipline service providers’ (World Bank, 2004). 
Since most of the residents are not enlightened about the role and obligations of the 
Council, vibrant educational campaigns offer a ray of hope towards participatory 
governance. The unavailability of basic services themselves due to the Council’s 
incapacity or unwillingness to deliver is in itself sufficient justification to ‘mobilize 
communities for action.’ The raison d’être of Councils throughout the world is to offer 
their residents affordable, high quality and regular services. When the authorities fail to 
do so, citizens have an incumbent obligation to spring into action for the fulfilment of their 
inalienable rights. This is the obtaining global good practice. In addition, most citizens are 
not aware of their rights. The flip side of the coin dictates that the Council itself has to 
self-introspect and promptly ceases forthwith the laissez faire approach to local 
governance issues in Harare.  
4.5 Community aspirations  
Communities living in the five (5) regions of the city of Harare where data that 
informs this research were generated passionately aired out their aspirations for the 
optimal engagement processes with local authorities they yearn for. In particular, the 
residents believe that the local authority must ‘open up’ and be the ‘people’s’ Council’. 
From an analytical point of view, citizen aspirations revolve around participatory 
                                                          
12 The NewsDay, May 8, 2014; The Daily News, April 3, 2014; Amnesty International May 26, 2012; The 
Guardian,  May 9, 2009 
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governance and responsive service delivery. Any attempt, therefore, aimed at internalizing 
social accountability processes with the Council’s administrative and operational 
architecture must incorporate these demand-side perspectives. Table 9 summarizes 
residents’ aspirations within the city of Harare.  
Table 9: Harare residents’ aspirations in social accountability 
Area Citizen aspirations for effective social accountability processes 
Northern   Council-citizen partnership in infrastructure maintenance; 
 Council feedback on development plans; and  
 Effective citizen-local authority engagement platforms 
North-eastern  Prompt response to service delivery complaints;  
 Participatory Budgeting; and 
 Joint planning and review meetings 
Southern (including 
South-eastern and 
South-western) 
 Regular service delivery; 
 Participation in local politics and governance; and 
 Personal security and crime reduction 
Western (including 
North-western) 
 Transparent allocation of municipal land; 
 Security of tenure; and  
 Accurate billing systems of municipal services 
Eastern  Access to municipal water; 
 Containing interparty violence and intimidation; and 
 Safe and affordance public transport  
Slum settlements  Access to municipal services; 
 Land ownership and legal title; and 
 Containing incessant epidemiological outbreaks  
Source: Fieldwork, 2016 
Whilst the obtaining situation in Harare exudes a dominance of the ‘long route to 
accountability’ through policy-makers (Councillors), citizens, through their collective 
action, prefer the ‘short route.’ This conduit links them directly with local authority 
professionals who are mandated, at law, to provide them with services and spaces to 
participate in how their affairs are managed. Undoubtedly, collective action by citizens 
will be critical in addressing situations where the Council has proved consistently 
unresponsive to the rights of its residents. Councillor-citizen engagement is a necessary 
but insufficient mechanism for fostering participatory local governance in Harare. This is 
precisely due to the weak feedback mechanisms where Councillors are unable to respond 
to residents’ concerns in a meaningful manner. They (the Councillors), instead, ‘hibernate’ 
for long periods of time only to become active during election seasons. In order to have 
effective residents-driven checks and balances mechanisms of accountability, the 
generally progressive local government legislative framework has to be enforced. This, 
consequently, will have a positive effect on efforts aimed at internal izing social 
accountability within Council.  
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4.6 An assessment of current and emerging Council capacity issues 
4.6.1. Centre-local relations 
The supervision of Local Authorities in Zimbabwe falls within the purview of the Ministry 
responsible for local governance. The responsible Minister is empowered, in terms of the Urban 
Councils Act (Chapter 29:15), to relieve both appointive and elective offices of Councils of 
their duties whenever he/she deems fit. The Minister is a presidential appointee. Key informant 
interviews with two (2) departmental heads in the Council exposed the political constraints that 
have made institutionalizing social accountability a particularly onerous task. They revealed 
that the Minister interferes unduly with the operations of the Council. The ministerial office 
has, since the attainment of political independence in 1980, been occupied by incumbents from 
the ruling party ZANU PF. However, with the emergence of a vibrant opposition (Movement 
for Democratic Change- Tsvangirai) in 1999, many Councillors elected into office have been 
from the MDC-T. Herein lays the problem. The successive Ministers have been accused of 
firing elected Councillors with reckless abandon for political expediency. The appointment of 
the Mrs Sekesai Makwavarara-led commission in 2002 to run the affairs of the city after the 
elected MDC-T mayor, Mr Elias Mudzuri, and his team were summarily fired by the then 
Minister, one Mr Ignatious Chombo, is a classical case in point. Mudzuri and his team of 
Councillors had been duly elected that year. The same Minister was also criticised for 
‘shielding’ the suspended Town Cleck13 (an alleged ruling party apologist), one Mr Tendai 
Mahachi, by the current MDC-T administration ‘just to spite his political foes and flex his 
muscles’. As at January 31, 2015 the then Town Clerk was earning US$37 642 per month 
which was unrealistically high. Allegations of blatant and unwarranted interference from the 
centre in the administration of the city continue to this day.  
4.6.2. Vertical and horizontal coordination 
Silo compartmentalization is one of the fundamental issues that have made institutionalization 
of social accountability within the Council untenable.  The Council currently has seven 
departments. These are Corporate Affairs, Finance, Health, Human Resources, Water, Public 
Safety and Works. Although this number of departments is reasonable, they function as silos 
in practice. Horizontal coordination amongst departments is weak. Internal cohesion within 
separate departments is poor. There is also role incompatibility. For instance, the Department 
of Corporate Affairs comprises housing and community services and chamber secretarial 
functions. Housing and community services are operational whilst the secretarial functions are 
administrative. What then is the rationale of combining these two internal functions? 
Consequently, does the departmental head have adequate competences and sector experience 
to be able to superintend the department in an effective manner? Is it not operationally prudent 
to separate operational and administrative functions? In addition, there seems to be a ‘missing 
middle’ between the lower level staff members (who are mostly operational) and the 
departmental heads, the administrators. As a result, mentoring and coaching for sustainable 
                                                          
13 New Zimbabwe, May 16, 2014; The Daily News, February 9, 2014; The Herald, February 3, 2014; Nehanda 
Radio, July 9, 2015;The Standard, February 2, 2014; The News Day, February 1, 2014; The Financial Gazette, 
February 13, 2014 
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organizational performance is lacking. This has an adverse impact on social accountability 
processes. 
4.6.3. Macro-economic fundamentals 
Zimbabwe is currently undergoing a tumultuous economic crisis. Several industries have 
closed14. The ones that remain are operating below 20% capacity utilization. Power outages 
are commonplace. Foreign direct investment inflows are at their lowest. Poor quality imports 
have flooded the market. Deflation remains a challenge. There is no incentive for ‘indigenous’ 
firms to produce due to severe exogenous competition. The majority of companies have gone 
for several years without paying their workers. Both state enterprises and private sector 
companies are downsizing and firing workers without moral restraint. Youth unemployment is 
at 90%. The majority of able-bodied men and women with university education are vegetable 
street vendors. The same proportion 
of people lives below the Poverty 
Datum Line (currently at US$584 for 
a family of 515) and less than US$2 
per day. In all probability these are 
consequences of failed national 
governance regime superintended by 
Mugabe. The net effect of these and 
other factors has been the inability of 
residents to meet their financial 
obligations to Council. This is the 
principal reason why the Council has 
not been responsive to the rights of the residents. The local authority estimates that it is owed 
in excess of US$300 million by residents16. This is despite that the then responsible Minister 
wrote off residents’ debts to Council which had amounted to US$350million17 on the eve of 
national and local authority elections in 2013. The reason why this was done is obvious. 
Ironically, whilst the local authority perennially pleads bankruptcy, its managers have been 
gobbling nearly US$0.5million every month in salaries and overseas holidays and luxuries 
amongst themselves.  
4.6.4. Political polarization 
Partisan politics within the Council are threatening efforts towards internalizing social 
accountability.  A Councillor who was interviewed as part of the data generation process in 
this research reveals that two (2) distinct ‘political divides’ are recognizable in the Council. 
The majority of Councillors belong to the MDC-T (main opposition party) whilst the 
professionals are perceived to be appendages of the ruling ZANU PF by virtue of being 
government appointees. The Councillor states that the current hullabaloo surrounding the 
                                                          
14 The News Day, February21, 2014; The Independent October 18, 2013; The Financial Gazette, February 20, 
2014 
15 ZIMSTAT, 2015 
1616 The Herald, June 25, 2015 
17 Nehanda Radio July 25, 2013; New Zimbabwe, July 22, 2013; The Chronicle, August 10, 2013; The Daily 
News, July 24, 2013 
Box 3: Remuneration structure at Harare 
City Council 
 US$0.5million salaries for 18 Directors per 
month; 
 Diverted US$144.4million loan by China to 
buy luxury cars for management; 
 Town Clerk earned US$37 000 per month; 
 Directors earned between US$33 000 and 
US$36 000 each per month; and 
 Overseas holidays and boat cruises. 
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dismissal of the Town Clerk by the Mayor shows how partisan politics can affect efforts 
towards strengthening social accountability in Harare. Partisan politics have also shaped how 
the Council staff members relate with residents. It is not uncommon for organized residents’ 
groups (such as CHRA and HRT) to be dismissed as ‘agents of the opposition seeking illegal 
regime change’ even when they bring to the attention of the local authority legitimate residents’ 
complaints. Civil society organizations have also been successfully stifled through the use of 
repressive laws. Residents who are ‘outspoken’ pose a risk to their own security, which the 
state is unable to guarantee. In the absence of primitive politicking, positive social 
accountability outcomes can be achieved in Harare.  
4.6.5. Appointive versus elective offices 
The acrimonious working relationship between politicians and technocrats in Council has been 
emphasized repeatedly by this researcher in 
this chapter. The case of the recent 
dismissal of the Town Clerk has been given 
to substantiate that the working relationship 
amongst the professionals and politicians in 
the Council is not cordial. An interesting 
dimension to this institutional dynamic 
relates to academic qualifications (relevant 
for effective local governance). The office 
of Councillorship in Zimbabwe does not 
require any minimal educational (or academic) qualifications. In other words, one becomes a 
Councillor solely on the basis of the popular will of their constituents and also servitude to the 
parent political party. On the contrary, the Council management is ‘fairly educated.’ This has 
been a source of hatred between the Council elective and appointive staff members. The former 
contend that the latter ‘do not take them seriously’ because of their apparent lack of academic 
competence in the realm of local governance. Ironically, the management is supposed to 
account to the politicians as elected representatives of the residents. On the other hand, this 
researcher learnt that the professionals themselves squarely blame the politicians for the weak 
social accountability processes obtaining in the Council. They often complain that they are 
unable to deliver optimally on their mandate (of providing services to residents) due to 
‘political interference’. Whilst this may seem accurate at face-value, this researcher concludes 
that the sector professionals have mastered the art of habitually apportioning blame elsewhere 
even for their own incompetence. These ‘turf wars’, resultantly, have affected efforts towards 
internalizing social accountability in an adverse manner. 
4.6.6. Revenue streams 
As has already been alluded to earlier in this report, the Council continues to plead bankruptcy. 
In terms of the Constitution of Zimbabwe, Councils are entitled not less than 5% budgetary 
allocations from the national fiscus every year. They (the Councils) are also empowered, in 
terms of the Urban Councils Act (Chapter 29:15), to levy charges to residents for a litany of 
‘services rendered’. In practice, however, and as one official in the Finance Department notes, 
central government has been unable to adhere to the aforementioned constitutional obligation. 
Box 4: Harare City Councilors’ Fact-file  
 46 Councilors elected in 2013; 
 15% female; 
 Seven (7) standing committees; 
 Council top managers earn 52 times 
more than Councilors; 
 Mayor earns US$450 per month; and 
 Elected for 5 year terms 
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And as if to add insult to injury, the centre usurped the traditional funding streams of local 
authorities notably the vehicle licensing function. Central government is also legally obliged 
to disburse funds to Councils under the Public Sector Investment Programme for infrastructural 
development. Unfortunately, that the government is illiquid and that it is even failing to pay its 
own workers is an open secret. Consequently, the Council has shifted the burden to the poor 
urbanites. It has even gone to the immoral extent of attaching properties18 owned by ‘defaulters’ 
as a means of recouping ‘its debts’. Again, this has been roundly condemned, justifiably so, in 
both the local and international media. Table 10 below shows the main revenue sources of the 
Harare City Council in 2010. 
Table 10: Harare City Council 2010 budget 
Revenue source Amount in US$ (millions) Percentage  
Supplementary charges  13.53 5.9 
Water income  77.33 33.6 
Rates  47.96 20.8 
Sewerage charges 14.69 6.4 
Refuse collection and sewer 24.87 10.8 
Quarry station (income 
generating project) 
8.39 3.6 
Street signs and advertising  1.65 0.7 
Vehicle licencing   4.85 2.1 
Cemetery fees 1.35 0.58 
Parking fees and parking fines  4.75 2.1 
Rentals (Council properties) 2.39 1.0 
School fees 1.07 0.5 
Health fees  4.93 2.1 
Shop licences  2.44 1.1 
Other licences  1.24 0.5 
Hire of stadia 0.58 0.3 
Other income 18.07 7.85 
TOTAL 230.09 100 
Source: Harare City Council, 2010 Budget 
4.6.7. Inertial factors 
The trait of loathing change is an inherent human characteristic. When officials and 
management loathe change it becomes an organizational curse. On February 5, 2014 the Harare 
City Council Finance Committee Chairperson resigned ‘in protest’ over the management’s 
refusal to release to him the salary schedule of top managers in the local authority. In his 
resignation letter addressed to the Mayor he laments: 
 “It is with regret that I tender my resignation as chairman of the finance committee 
and indeed the committee itself. I do not believe that anyone with any self-respect would chair 
the Harare City Council finance committee as it stands and runs today. For over six months 
                                                          
18 The Herald, June 25, 2015;  The Standard, November 11, 2012; The Daily News, December 11, 2014; The 
NewsDay June 9, 2015; The Zimbabwean February 16, 2012; The New Zimbabwe 
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we have been waiting for contracts of grade one to four employees…The band alone accounts 
for nearly 10 percent of our wage bill.”  
That a mere Council employee withholds lawfully requested information by a political 
principal as part of the routine checks and balances processes of accountability boggles the 
mind. As residents’ representatives, Councillors reserve the right to request information from 
the management that they deem to be in the public interest. The refusal by the responsible 
department to provide the information as duly requested by the principal is an expression of 
organizational inertia and unwillingness to embrace the change agenda. To whom are the 
professionals accountable to? On what basis would the responsible department withhold 
information from a principal? Why is it that no punitive action was taken for this blatant 
disregard of authority? Do the ‘culprits’ have protection of powerful figures ‘behind the scenes’? 
What is clear, though, is that such inertial behaviour is detrimental to efforts aimed at 
institutionalizing social accountability in the Council. 
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4.6.8. 
Communication and feedback 
Communication and effective feedback mechanisms constitute critical means by which 
a local authority can engage with its residents. The communication conduit must be two-way. 
First, in order to foster social accountability, the Council should inform its residents about the 
alternative ways in which they (the citizens) can participate in local governance. This 
communication must go beyond invoices and requests for payments for ‘services rendered’ by 
the local authority. It must deliberately raise awareness on how residents should partake in 
social accountability processes and activities. This is because the residents are the ultimate 
consumers of ‘services’ provided by the Council. Second, the residents themselves must always 
be an informed lot concerning social accountability issues at the local level. An informed 
citizenry is able to hold the Council, as the duty-bearer, to account and to be responsive to their 
rights and needs. Again, communication from the demand side must go beyond mere 
complaints and agitations. Indeed, meeting financial obligations to Council is in itself a way of 
communicating with the local authority. The Council has been unable to communicate 
effectively with the recipient communities of their ‘services’. The Council website, which 
signals an essential leap towards e-governance, is so lean on social accountability information 
that would be beneficial to residents. There is no meaningful information on the platform to 
enable an in-depth critique of its social accountability processes. This researcher argues that 
Fig. 7: Resignation letter of the Finance Committee Chairperson 
“An amazing folly which I cannot accept is a budget of US$1.6 million to 
sponsor a football club in the current economic crisis. Yet the Harare City 
Council cannot afford any support to its amenities and associated 
residents.  I shudder at the water rehabilitation deal that has been signed 
in the deal. Information technology equipment is covered in this contract 
which I have not seen for the tune of over US$1million. Yet in the HCC 
budget, we also had a similar budget placed for similar equipment.”  
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the website has been set merely to satisfy ‘global trends’ in municipal governance. Surfing for 
information in the voluminous and dusty files domiciled in Council offices is an arduous task. 
Thus, and suffice to say, effective communication strategies remain absent within the Council.  
4.6.9. Capacity to engage 
A cursory analysis of the data obtained through the self-assessment method reveals that 
the Council’s capacity to engage with its strategic stakeholders is weak. Engagement, in this 
instance, means the ability to foster and sustain effective communication between the Council 
and all stakeholders in the social accountability processes. The Council admitted that a sizeable 
number of residents in its jurisdiction do not even know what the mandate of the local authority 
as an institution is. At the Council level, this researcher found that the local authority’s mandate 
is understood merely as that of being a service provider. The Council has not been effectively 
duty-bound to raise awareness to the communities of its role in local governance. There are no 
deliberate efforts at the Council to tap into the indigenous knowledge streams of ‘senior’ 
residents as a way of organizational learning. The recent dismissal of some long-serving 
operational and managerial staff does not augur well for sustaining institutional memory. In 
addition, the Council’s relationship with the parent Ministry has been a subservient one. 
Consequently, it is arm-twisted incessantly by the centre in a manner that exudes political 
overtones rather than the need to foster and internalize social accountability. The Council 
seems, to this researcher, oblivious of the fact that they are a lawful and constitutional 
institution that must utilize its juristic existence to rebuff undue interference from the centre. 
They must, therefore, utilize judicial channels to obtain legal recourse whenever they are 
aggrieved by unreasonable directives from the centre. The inertial behaviour of the Council 
will not contribute to this preferred end-state in a meaningful manner. And, as always, it is the 
proverbial grass (residents and social accountability systems) that suffers when the elephants 
(Council and the Ministry) fight. Table 11 assesses the Council’s institutional capacity. 
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Table 11: Assessment Harare City Council capacity  
Capacity issue Rating Current practice Capacity Needs 
Internal coordination Weak  Departmental silos; 
 ‘Turf wars’; 
 Role duplication; and 
 Weak mandate clarification at departmental level 
 Broad engagement spaces; 
 Role clarity; 
 Leadership; and 
 Strategic management 
Citizen engagement Weak   Vendor eviction; 
 House demolitions; 
 Full Council meeting; and  
 Budgetary processes 
 Community mobilization; 
 Participatory governance; 
 Stakeholder inclusion; and 
 Communication  
Knowledge management Weak  Website; 
 Press releases; 
 Files; and 
 Formal correspondence  
 One-stop information centre; 
 Website systems upgrade and updates; 
 Vernacular communication; and 
 E-governance 
Service provision 
 
 
Weak   Systems failure (obsolete water and sanitation distributional networks); 
 Impassable roads; 
 Abandoned community facilities; and 
 Inaccurate billing (overstatements) 
 Partnership approach; 
 Private sector driven delivery; 
 Routine and periodic infrastructure maintenance; and 
 Outsourcing  
Institutional memory  Weak   Retrenchments; 
 Downsizing;  
 File-based recording; and  
 Staff redeployments 
 E-based knowledge generation and storage; 
 Engaging retired professionals; 
 Consulting senior citizens; and  
 Introspection  
Autonomy  Weak   Subservient centre-local relations; 
 Political interference; 
 Arm-twisting by the centre; and  
 Internal professionals-politicians squabbles 
 Legal recourse; 
 Professionalism; 
 Effective systems; and 
 Rule of law 
Resource mobilization  Weak   Reliance on residents’ contributions; 
 Attaching defaulters’ properties; 
 Loss-making income generating projects; and 
 Inadequate central support 
 Broadening twinning arrangements; 
 Confidence building; 
 Good governance; and  
 Rationalizing remuneration  
Source: Fieldwork, 2016 (Self-Assessment Forms)
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4.7 ActionAid International Zimbabwe: A civil society lead actor 
ActionAid International Zimbabwe (AAIZ) deserves credit for the contribution it 
has made in the social accountability cause in local governance. Its  Accountability 
Programme Objective Plan (2014-2018) focuses on how impoverished residents can 
participate in ensuring sustainable access to high quality, equitable and gender responsive 
public services. The organization envisages a scenario whereby educational, heath, water 
and sanitation services are provided to residents in an egalitarian manner. This could be 
achieved through focussing on five (5) key actions namely skills training and capacity 
building, reflection/action, coalition building, policy research/evidence gathering and 
advocacy and campaigning. Through a partnering approach with grassroots organizations 
the organization has played a critical role in narrowing the chasm between residents and 
the Council.  Social accountability issues are at the core of AAIZ’s development work. 
More importantly, the international non-state organization has been advocating for a 
paradigmatic shift from contextualizing service delivery as ‘needs’ to ‘rights’ of recipient 
communities. According to them, denial or sub-optimal delivery of services by the Council 
is an injustice. Duty-bearers such as Councils have a lawful and justiciable obligation to 
provide services to their constituents in a responsive manner. Thus, the thrust of fostering 
a rights-based approach to service delivery by AAIZ is commendable.  
Moreover, AAIZ’s Country Strategy (2014-2018) focuses on strengthening citizens’ 
actions against poverty. Poverty is, indeed, the single most important factor that has 
militated against the active participation of residents in how their issues are administered 
by Councils. The strategy is premised on three (3) key objectives. These relate, first, to 
promoting improved livelihoods and enhanced rights to land. Second, advancing the 
political influence of women, men and children to hold government and corporates to 
account is emphasized. Finally, ensuring that women and girls break the cycle of violence 
is the other strategic objective. The feminine gender is particularly critical in social 
accountability by virtue of their demographic superiority. The means through which AAIZ 
operationalizes these objectives include, inter alia, sensitization meetings, Training of 
Trainers courses (for implementing partners), networking and coalition building. The 
organization collaborates with public institutions, does participatory research, advocacy 
and lobbying and capacity building as part of its implementation framework. Collective 
action and citizen agency of rights-holders (citizens) and responsiveness by duty-bearers 
(state institutions) also constitute its work. Hence, AAIZ has contributed to the social 
accountability cause in a fundamental way.  
4.8. Chapter conclusion  
This chapter, perhaps the most significant of all, presented and analyzed the data that 
were generated during the fieldwork phase of the research relative to the issues under review. 
It starts by analysing the policy and practice of social accountability processes in the city of 
Harare. The role of several civil society groups in leading the advocacy efforts for the 
institutionalization of social accountability within the Harare City Council is emphasized 
throughout the chapter. Several case studies from an array of civil society organizations are 
provided to assess the status of social accountability within the city. The guiding question, of 
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course, relates to whether the Council has adequately institutionalized social accountability 
issues within its administrative and operational architecture. Good practices by these 
organizations were learnt and are detailed in this chapter. The focus then shifts to the contextual 
(operational and administrative environment) issues affecting the internalization of social 
accountability in the Council. Partisan politics are particularly identified as one of the most 
fundamental inhibiting factors. There is an apparent rift between the Council professionals and 
politicians pertaining mainly to their functional spaces and internal accountability mechanisms.  
The roles and obligations of the residents themselves in achieving optimal social accountability 
outcomes in Harare are identified and analyzed. Finally, this researcher refocuses on the Harare 
City Council’s capacity from several vantage points. The following chapter provides summary 
conclusions to the issues under review and offers some alternative courses of action, from both 
the demand- and supply-sides, that can be explored to internalize social accountability in 
Harare. 
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5.0 Summary Conclusions and Recommendations 
5.1 Chapter introduction  
The preceding chapter presented the findings that were generated during the research 
and provided an in-depth analysis of social accountability processes and mechanisms in the 
city of Harare. A demand-supply side analytical framework was employed to evaluate the 
extent to which social accountability has been institutionalized as part of the governance 
architecture of Zimbabwe’s capital city. In this chapter, this researcher draws conclusions from 
the analysis of data that were generated during the empirical study. It should be stated from the 
onset that this researcher, based on rigorous data analyses, concludes that the Harare City 
Council, as lead actor and duty bearer, has failed to steer social accountability processes in an 
effective manner. Whilst all the blame cannot be apportioned to the local authority, this 
researcher contends that the Council has abrogated on its constitutional obligation of providing 
decent services to the residents of Harare at reasonable price regimes. It could be argued that 
this is deliberate. How can local authority that perennially pleads bankruptcy afford to spend 
US$0.5million on paying salaries of eighteen (18) ‘directors’ every month? This researcher 
proposes an alternative model for institutionalizing social accountability in the Council. The 
operationalization of this model is founded on some express assumptions. Some suggested 
options for rejuvenating the Council’s governance mechanisms are provided herein.  
5.2 Study conclusions  
Through a scientific analysis (using the STATA computer software) of the data that 
were generated in the study, this researcher makes several conclusions which are 
fivefold.  
 First, the Harare City Council does not have effective engagement spaces where the 
‘city fathers’, and the few ‘city mothers’ there, interact robustly with the residents. 
The data show that the officials engage in complex information hoarding from the 
residents to shield themselves from bona fide scrutiny; 
  Second, the means through which residents are involved in municipal governance 
processes by the local authority are merely tokenistic. For instance, the residents 
attend budget-making sessions by the Council to rubberstamp financial management 
decisions made exclusively by the technocrats and politicians; 
 Third, whilst the role of various civil society organizations operating within the local 
authority jurisdiction is evolving and strategic, these actors face internal capacity 
challenges to effectively engage with the Council. This relates mainly to their 
inability to meaningfully mobilize communities to partake in local governance; 
  Fourth, a gamut of legislative shields continues to militate against participatory 
governance in Harare. For example, civil society organisations (such as residents’ 
representatives) only attend full Council meetings by the local authority as ex officio 
members. Consequently, they (civil society) are unable to effectively leverage 
Council social accountability and decision-making processes that have adverse 
ramifications on residents’ livelihoods; and 
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 Fifth and finally, there are no deliberate efforts by the Council (as the duty-bearer) to 
harness contributions of local communities, as rights holders, in the governance 
architecture. This has affected institutionalization of social accountability in an 
adverse manner.  
5.3 Proposed model for institutionalizing social accountability in Harare
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5.3.1 Underlying assumptions 
The functionality of the proposed model is founded on the assumptions that the social 
accountability processes, driven by Council as lead actor, will be: 
 Inclusive and participatory; 
 Balanced in terms of demand and supply side considerations; and 
 Dynamic and responsive to residents’ rights. 
Table 12 below provides definitional clarity to the proposed multi-actor processes and 
mechanisms in the model. 
Table 12: Model Accountability Relationships 
Relationship Operational connotations 
Local authority –
Citizens 
Primary focus of the model in which citizens and local authorities engage 
through defined processes and tools 
Civil society –Citizens Processes that civil society must prioritize to build the capacity of citizens in 
engaging with local authorities 
Civil society-Local 
authority 
Mutual collaboration between the local authority and civil society provides an 
enabling environment for citizens to demand accountability 
Citizens - Private 
sector  
Processes that bring in, and capitalise on, private sector initiatives to social 
accountability. 
Private sector – Local 
authority 
Processes that assist both local authorities and private sector in providing 
services to citizens 
Civil society – Private 
Sector  
Processes that assist both civil society and private sector in providing services 
to citizens 
Source: Analysis, 2016 
6.4 Recommendations 
This researcher proposes a gamut of alternative courses of action to reconfigure the social 
accountability system in Harare with a dual focus. On the one hand, the Council, as the duty bearer, 
has a lawful obligation to provide affordable, regular and high quality services to residents in a 
sustainable manner. This is the supply-side dynamic. Citizens, on the other hand and as right 
holders, must engage Council to be responsive to their rights (demand side considerations). Table 
13 below is summarizes the recommendations. 
  
Table 13: Supply-demand side recommendations 
Supply side (Harare City Council) Demand side (citizens, civil society and private sector) 
 Reconfigure the governance processes progressively, and yet radically, to 
ensure effective engagement with all stakeholders. Positive social 
accountability outcomes will only be achieved in Harare if the local authority 
actively promotes inclusive and accountable governance regimes; 
 
 Cease, forthwith, token consultations (laissez faire) of residents in 
significant processes (such as budgeting) by promoting active citizenship 
and strengthening citizen voice. Residents have an inalienable right to 
participate meaningfully in how their affairs are managed by the Council; 
 
 Provide a facilitatory and enabling institutional environment for other 
actors to thrive. The use of archaic legislative shields and statutory barriers 
to rebuff bona fide criticism from residents and organizations that represent 
them must end; 
 
 Lead the reform agenda to ensure that local governance within the city 
becomes participatory and egalitarian. Inertial behavior and resistance to 
change does not augur well with efforts aimed at democratizing the 
management of public affairs; and 
 
 Reduce administrative overheads (particularly salary excesses) as a way 
of channeling the scarce resources towards improving service delivery 
and enhancing social accountability mechanisms. The illegal violation of 
the 30%-70% remuneration-service delivery threshold must be accounted for 
and attendant justice applied. 
 Assume active citizenship by meeting financial obligations to the local authority for 
services rendered. The residents must substantiate their concerns for accountable governance 
through evidence of paying rates and other service delivery charges; 
 
 Demand services through a rights-based approach. This could be done by conceptualizing 
service delivery and social accountability concerns as citizen rights rather than routine 
institutional obligations of the Council; 
 
 Make institutionalization of social accountability an overarching objective of lobbying 
and advocacy efforts.  Appropriate institutional arrangements that are legally enforceable, 
especially by non-Council stakeholders, need to be put in place; 
 
 Build own capacity to partake in the governance of the city meaningfully. This includes 
the capacity to engage in, leverage, lobby and mobilize effectively in local authority social 
accountability processes by the Council (as the lead agency); and  
 
 Replicate global good practices by learning lessons from other jurisdictions around the 
world. This replication must be done within the specific contextual differentials of the city of 
Harare as a distinct political space and be adapted to dovetail well with obtaining local 
conditions. 
Source: Analysis, 2016 
  
6.5 Chapter conclusion  
The essence of this chapter was to articulate the specific conclusions that this 
researcher drew from the analysis of data that were generated in the field. Whilst  some critics 
may interpret the conclusions as adverse and unpalatable, they (the findings) undoubtedly 
illustrate the status quo in terms of governance within the Council’s jurisdiction. In order to 
reconfigure the administration of the city so that it is inclusive and responsive, a robust model 
was proposed. It was suggested that the local authority, as the lead agency in steering social 
accountability processes, must take a proactive role in operationalising the model. The laissez 
faire approach to local governance that the Council currently exudes has aggravated the  
defective management of the city. A sustained reform agenda has to be pursued with equal 
promptitude. More importantly, the capacity of civil society, residents and the private sector 
has to be built in order to implement the dynamic model that this researcher proposes. There 
must now be concerted efforts to ensure that the institutionalization of social accountability 
processes becomes an overarching goal of all actors whose interests are at stake in the 
administration of Harare. 
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Annexes 
Annex 1: Focus group discussion guide 
 
1. How do you, as residents, participate in Council affairs? 
2. In what ways have you contributed to service delivery in the city?  
3. Which organized community groups represent residents at Council level? 
4. What is your perception on governance of this area? 
5. How do you relate with the Council? 
6. Do you have any challenges engaging with Council? If so, specify. 
7. What needs to be done to improve the relationship between residents and Council? 
 
  
Annex 2: Key informant guide 
1. Is social accountability an integral part of municipal governance in Harare? 
2. Which specific mechanisms illustrate the engagement platforms between the Council 
and residents? 
3. How do you rate the Council’s social accountability policy and  practice? 
4. Are there lagging areas that require urgent redress at Council level? 
5. Has citizen participation in governance been promoted by the Council? 
6. What are the major factors behind the deterioration of service delivery in Harare? 
7. Does partisan politics have a role to play in scaling up social accountability processes?  
8. What can be done to improve social accountability in Harare? 
  
Annex 3: Institutional self-assessment tool 
This tool19 is aimed at assessing the capacity of the organization to foster and sustain social 
accountability as part of the governance of the city of Harare.  
Name of Organization 
………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
Position of Person completing the form 
………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
1. How do you define social accountability? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………….  
2. What are your views on social accountability in Harare? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
3. Please indicate the rating of your organization’s competences   
Competence Rating  Comment(s) 
1 2 3 4 5 
Information dissemination       
Policy research       
Advocacy and lobbying       
Community capacity 
building 
      
 
4. Explain the social accountability strategies that you use as an organization.  
Rating Comments 
                                                          
19 For any rating 1 is the lowest and 5 is the highest. 
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Social accountability 
strategy 
1 2 3 4 5 
       
       
       
       
 
5. Assess the effectiveness of the specific social accountability tools that you employ 
Social accountability 
tool 
Rating Comment(s) 
1 2 3 4 5 
       
       
       
       
       
 
6. How do you describe you social accountability processes over the years?  
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
7. Assess the conduciveness of social accountability contexts in Harare 
Filter Rating Explain 
1 2 3 4 5 
Political       
Economic       
Social Accountability and Municipal 
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Institutional        
Technology       
Legal       
 
8. Share the strategic lessons that your social accountability processes have generated 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
9. Comment on the role of citizens in municipal governance within the context of 
Harare 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
10. State the challenges you have faced in promoting social accountability in Harare  
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
11. What must be done to improve social accountability in Harare? 
………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
12. Internal capacity issues (Rate weak or strong) 
Capacity issue Rating Current practice (Comment) Capacity Needs (Comment) 
Internal coordination    
Citizen engagement     
Social Accountability and Municipal 
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Knowledge 
management 
    
Service provision 
 
 
    
Institutional memory      
Autonomy     
Resource mobilization      
  
Annex 4: Household questionnaire 
A: INTRODUCTION  
Thank you for participating in this study.  This questionnaire seeks to obtain residents’ opinions 
on the governance of the city of Harare by the authorities (Harare City Council). Your responses 
will be used for purely for academic purposes. 
B: GENERAL 
1. Date  
………………………………………………………………………………………………... 
 
2. Name of neighbourhood  
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
3. Type of neighbourhood (Tick appropriate category) 
Low density Middle density                       High density     Slum 
 
C: SOCIO-ECONOMIC 
4. Sex of respondent (Tick appropriate gender) 
Male                              Female  
 
5. Sex of household head (Tick appropriate gender) 
Male                                Female 
  
6. Age of respondent (Tick appropriate category) 
21-40 years                41-60years             61-80 years               81 years and above 
 
7. Household size (Tick appropriate category) 
1-3members               4-6members                7-9 members              10 members and above 
 
8. Employment status of breadwinner (Tick appropriate response) 
Formally employed           Informally employed        Partially employed         Unemployed  
 
9. Monthly income, in US$,  of breadwinner (Tick appropriate response) 
Less than 200          201-600            601-1000          1001 or more  
 
D: SERVICE DELIVERY AVAILABILITY, REGULARITY AND SATISFACTION 
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10. Which Council services do you receive (Tick appropriate response) 
 
Service  Availability  
Yes No 
Water    
Refuse collection   
Street lighting    
Health   
Education    
Community facilities (e.g. halls)   
Road maintenance    
Planning services (e.g. housing designs)   
Leisure facilities   
Other (specify) ……………………………………………… 
………………………………………………. 
……………………………………………….. 
 
11. Rate the quality of services delivered by the Council (Tick appropriate response) 
Service  Quality of services provided  
High Satisfactory Poor  
Water     
Refuse collection    
Street lighting     
Health    
Education     
Community facilities (e.g. halls)    
Road maintenance     
Planning services (e.g. housing designs)    
Leisure facilities    
 
12. Rate the regularity of  services delivered by the Council (Tick appropriate response) 
Service  Regularity of services provided  
Regular  Not regular 
  
Water    
Refuse collection   
Street lighting    
Health   
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Education    
Community facilities (e.g. halls)   
Road maintenance    
Planning services (e.g. housing designs)   
Leisure facilities   
 
13. Rate the affordability of services delivered by the Council (Tick appropriate response) 
 
Service  Affordability of services provided  
Affordable  Not affordable 
  
Water    
Refuse collection   
Street lighting    
Health   
Education    
Community facilities (e.g. halls)   
Road maintenance    
Planning services (e.g. housing designs)   
Leisure facilities   
 
E: GOVERNANCE 
14. Participation in Council processes (Tick appropriate response) 
Activity  Yes No  
Elections    
Budget 
making 
  
Clean-up 
campaigns 
  
Social Accountability and Municipal 
Governance   
 
 
Service 
protests  
  
Road 
maintenance  
  
Awareness 
campaigns  
  
Full Council 
meetings  
  
Other 
(specify) 
……………………………………………………………………………... 
 
…………………………………………………………………………….. 
15. Familiarity with social accountability tools (Tick appropriate response) 
 
Tool  Yes  No  
Citizen audits   
Citizen juries   
Public hearings    
Study circles    
Public forums     
Public revenue tracking   
Budget analysis   
Expenditure tracking    
Procurement    
Report cards   
Others (specify) ……………………………………………………………… 
………………………………………………………………. 
……………………………………………………………….. 
 
16. State some of the challenges that you face with interacting with Council 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
17. What can be done to improve relations between the Council and the residents 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
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